Smith v. General Scanning, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
832 F.2d 96 · 1987
Citation profile
14 federal appellate · 1 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 28 later decisions — most recently December 2003 · most notably Gilardi v. Schroeder (1987), Smith v. General Scanning, Inc. (1989)
14 federal appellate · 1 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 29 U.S.C. § 621 (§ 2 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967) · 29 U.S.C. § 626 (§ 7 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967) · 29 U.S.C. § 633 (§ 14 of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967)
Relies on Cannon v. University of Chicago · Stafford v. Oklahoma · Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans · Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection · New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Chevrolet Motor Division, General Motors Corp.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[n]o civil action may be commenced ... until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage“First, as a matter of statutory construction, § 633(b) says, ‘In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a [deferral] State ... no suit may be brought ... before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the state law ...’ Thus, the statute on its face requires an aggrieved party to commence proceedings in the appropriate agency of the state in which the alleged act of discrimination occurred.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“On October 3, 1980, GSI hired appellant Smith, then 57 years old, to be an Applications Engineer/Sales Person in its Eastern Region motor division office in Boston. A year later the company transferred him to the Central Region [also known as the Midwest region] office in Chicago, as a Sales Engineer, to promote GSI’s two basic products, Elec-tro-Optical (laser) Scanners and ElectroMechanical (strip chart) Recorders. However, Smith was notified by letter dated December 9, 1983, that GSI was closing its Central Region sales office, and that Smith’s duties would terminate on December 31,1983. The reason given for the termination was that GSI was forced to reduce its sales staff ‘because of a second year of flat sales and reduced profits.’ Smith was then 60 years old. Smith filed a charge of age discrimination with the Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations on June 26,1984. That agency returned the charge to him for lack of jurisdiction over an employer located in Massachusetts. Thereafter, on September 5 of that year, he submitted the charge to the Boston office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; the EEOC replied that it would not proceed further with its processing of Smith’s charge. Smith’s third filing was this action, brought in federal district court in Wisconsin on December 6, 1985. The district court, without addressing the administrative filing requirements of the ADEA, granted GSI’s motion for summary judgment on two grounds. It first ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.