Williams v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “With bifurcation ... comes the difficulty of explaining to a jury why the defendant is facing trial for merely possessing a firearm. To the extent the trial court's instruction informed the jury that Williams was alleged to have possessed the firearm illegally for some reason, such was likely already the common sense conclusion of the jurors . The instruction also is clear that there would be a second phase of the trial if, and only if, the jury first concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams had knowingly or intentionally possessed a firearm. It did not, as Williams argues, imply that a second phase of the trial was inevitable. .... Here, the trial court circumvented legitimate concerns regarding fairness by avoiding reference to Williams as a "serious violent felon" until after the jury had decided whether he had knowingly or intentionally possessed the AK-47. .... In sum, we conclude the trial court here struck the proper balance between advising the jury that Williams had indeed been charged with a firearm-related crime and avoiding identifying Williams as a "serious violent felon" from the outset of trial. Although current precedent does not require trial courts to bifurcate SVF trials, we believe that the bifurcation procedure serves the ends of justice in such trials and urge our state's trial judges to use this procedure in SVF cases.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Malcolm R. DePriest v. State of Indiana

2. “(d) A conviction does not count for purposes of this section as a prior unrelated felony conviction if: (1) the conviction has been set aside; (2) the conviction is one for which the person has been pardoned; or (3) all of the following apply: (A) The offense is an offense under IC 16-42-19 or IC 85-48-4. (B) The offense is not listed in seetion 2(b)(4) of this chapter. (C) The total number of unrelated convictions that the person has for: (i) dealing in or selling a legend drug under IC 1642-19-27; (ii) dealing in cocaine or a nareotic drug (IC 35-48-4-1); (ii) dealing in a schedule I, IJ, III controlled substance (IC 35-48-4-2); (iv) dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance (IC 85-484-3); and (v) dealing in a schedule V controlled substance (IC 35-48-4-4); does not exceed one (1).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Owens v. State

3. “The Defendant is charged with Illegal Possession of a Firearm. The trial of charge [sic] will be in two (2) stages. In the first stage, there will be a trial on the issue of whether the Defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed the firearm as charged. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed the firearm as charged, there will be a second stage of the trial. In the second stage, there will be a trial of the issue whether the Defendant committed a crime by possessing a firearm.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Malcolm R. DePriest v. State of Indiana