Cunningham v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(A) Causes triable by court and by jury. Issues of law and issues of fact in causes that prior to the eighteenth day of June, 1852, were of exclusive equitable jurisdiction shall be tried by the court; issues of fact in all other causes shall be triable as the same are now triable. In case of the joinder of causes of action or defenses which, prior to said date, were of exclusive equitable jurisdiction with causes of action or defenses which, prior to said date, were designated as actions at law and triable by jury—the former shall be triable by the court, and the latter by a jury, unless waived; the trial of both may be at the same time or at different times, as the court may direct.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lucas v. U.S. Bank, N.A. · Robert M. Gates v. City of Indianapolis

2. “[in all civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lucas v. U.S. Bank, N.A. · Lucas v. U.S. Bank, N.A.

3. “Clearly, the simplest way to determine whether a respondent has the right to a jury trial in a proceeding for a speeding infraction would be to look at the 1852 statutes governing speed zones. That approach is of little help here, however, because the earliest versions of today’s speed zone statutes were not codified until 1939. We must therefore proceed to the alternative path of analysis that Justice Boehm discusses [in his concurring opinion in Midwest Sec. Life Ins. Co.]: whether the cause of action at issue is equitable or legal in nature. We must determine whether an action for a traffic infraction would have been considered equitable had it existed in 1852. We hold that it would not have been an equitable action. In making this determination, we note that, until 1981, an infraction was considered a criminal action and was not governed by what were then titled the Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure. Wirgau [v. State ], 443 N.E.2d [327] at 329, n. 1 [ (1982) ] .... It is clear that from the time of their inception until 1981, when the Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure and, now, the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure began to govern the enforcement of infraction violations, such offenses were criminal actions and, as such, were not equitable in nature. [[Image here]] Though they are now governed by the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure, speeding infractions remain quasi-criminal in nature — they are enforced by the police; complaints are initiated and litigated by a prosecuting”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Robert M. Gates v. City of Indianapolis