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836 N.E.2d 1049

Fuchs v. Martin

Indiana Court of Appeals

Decided November 10, 2005

Indiana Court of Appeals · decided 2005-11-10

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently April 2006

2 state decisions

Applies IN 34 § 34-8-1-4

Relies on Carter v. Hicks

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2005-11-10

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ROBB, Judge,

¶1concurring in result.

¶2I respectfully concur in the result reached by the majority with respect to reversal of the preemptive mediation provision of the trial court's order. I write separately to address the propriety of the local rule in general.

¶3Trial courts may establish rules for their own governance pursuant to Trial Rule 81 and Indiana Code section 34-8-1-4. These rules are to be supplementary to and not conflict with any statute or supreme court rule. See Ind.Code § 34-8-1-4. I agree that alternative dispute resolution is a good idea in many cases; however, I believe the local rule at issue here goes too far in imposing additional, significant restrictions on litigants that are not present in the dissolution statutes. The local rule does provide a "good cause" exception, but "good cause" is not defined and the exception puts an unfair onus on the litigants. The local rule at issue is not merely a procedural rule for the governance of the courts, but restricts the litigants' ability to have their day in court. See In re Paternity of A.M.C., 758 N.E.2d 536, 539-40 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (holding that local rule which restricted the filing of a petition for modification of custody, support or spousal maintenance unless one year had elapsed from the last order or an extreme emergency is shown was in conflict with modification statute and was unenforceable). I would hold that the local rule is unenforceable on the whole. As the majority reverses that part of the trial court's order regarding mediation in this particular case, however, I concur in the result the majority has reached with respect to this issue.

¶4Moreover, I note, as does the majority, that the trial court abused its discretion in restricting the mediators that the parties could use to those specifically named. Op. at 1059 n. 7. Schedules, costs, and conflicts must be considered when choosing a mediator, and the trial court is no position to assess these conditions prospectively. In addition, pre-selecting mediators will not take into account subsequent changes in the cireumstances of those mediators.

¶5Subject to the above comments with respect to the mediation order, I concur fully in the remainder of the majority opinion.

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