Ross v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Ross had one prior felony: a 1982 conviction for first-degree sexual assault that involved circumstances similar to the assaults Ross committed against V.B. and S.A. For the earlier crime, Ross received an eight-year* term; he was on parole for that offense when he committed the current offenses. For the incident involving S.A., Ross was convicted of kidnapping and five counts of first-degree sexual assault. Kidnapping, an unclassified felony, is punishable by a maximum term of 99 years and a minimum of five; the crime is not subject to presumptive sentencing. AS 11.41-300(c); AS 12.55.125(b). First-degree sexual assault, also an unclassified felony, is punishable by a maximum of thirty years; as a second felony offender, Ross was subject to presumptive terms of fifteen years for each of his first-degree sexual assault convictions. AS 11.41.410(b); AS 12.55.-125(f)(3). For the incident involving V.B., Ross was convicted of one count of second-degree sexual assault, a class B felony. He was subject to a four-year presumptive term for that offense. AS 11.41.420(b); AS 12.55.125(d). [[Image here]] In imposing sentence, Judge Michalski concluded that Ross was an extremely dangerous offender who had little chance for rehabilitation. The judge thus stressed the need to isolate Ross for the protection of the community. Judge Miehalski sentenced Ross to fifty years for kidnapping. The judge imposed fifteen years for each count of first-degree sexual assault, making the two counts inv”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ross v. State

2. “Our review indicated “a fair degree of uniformity” in sentencing in such cases. Williams, 800 P.2d at 958 . We noted that the cases fell into three benchmark categories. The initial category consisted of first felony offenders. For offenders in this category, we observed that sentences exceeding twenty years of unsuspended time had rarely been approved. Id. at 959 . The second benchmark category included kidnap/rape cases involving offenders who had one or more prior felony convictions but whose criminal history was not sufficiently extensive to place them in the dangerous offender category. As to this category, we found that “precedents firmly establish thirty years as the maximum composite sentence that should ordinarily be imposed_” Id. In the third benchmark category, we found “a handful of decisions” approving composite sentences of more than thirty years of unsuspended time; we observed that “[wjithout exception, those eases have involved kidnappings of prolonged duration or offenders whose prior criminal histories established them as persistent, violent criminals.” Id. at 960 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ross v. State

3. “Williams [II] ... reaffirmed the fundamental need for consideration of historical sentencing practices — as reflected in benchmark sentences — in the sentencing process; ... this need springs from the legislature’s concern with promoting sentencing uniformity and eliminating unjustified disparity — a concern the legislature expressed with “unmistakable clarity” in AS 12.55.005(1), which requires the sentencing court to consider “the seriousness of the defendant’s present offense in relation to other offenses.” [In Williams II] we concluded: At a minimum, ... the principle of reasonable sentencing uniformity requires a sentencing judge who decides that an offender deserves a sentence which is significantly different from sentences previously given to similarly situated offenders to expressly find some legitimate basis for the difference — some basis related to ‘legally relevant sentencing criteria.’ That basis should be spelled out on the sentencing record, so that the defendant and a reviewing court can understand the reasons for the disparity.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ross v. State