Moore v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “If an unindicted suspect who has been the subject of a lawful arrest has a constitutional right to a speedy resolution of the pending charges against him, then we have little doubt in concluding that the suspect may demand that the State proceed with reasonable dispatch to resolve the matter. Whether, in the absence of an existing circuit court criminal proceeding, that demand may be advanced by more informal means, e.g., a letter to the prosecuting attorney, is a matter we need not reach in this instance since Moore made no demand, formal or informal, during the long period between his arrest and indictment that the State proceed by some means to speedily dispose of the pending criminal matter. It appears on this record that Moore was content to remain free on bond without insisting that the pending charges against him be resolved. This is, perhaps, understandable in that Moore may have believed that, with the passing of time, the likelihood of an indictment grew less and less certain. Whether that was, in fact, Moore’s thinking on the matter is certainly not clear, but it is certain that it was within his power to make his position definitely known by affirmatively stating it for the record in some manner that would be preserved for subsequent consideration by this Court. In the absence of any such demand, we think that Moore’s prolonged failure to demand a speedy resolution of the case must be weighed against his entitlement to relief.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 5 So. 3d 496 - Williams v. State

2. “The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that speedy trial claims necessarily entail questions of fact regarding “whether the trial delay rose from good cause.” DeLoach v. State, 722 So.2d 512 (¶ 12) (Miss.1998). This Court must uphold the trial court’s findings on the issue of speedy trial where supported by “substantial, credible evidence; [but] if no probative evidence supports the trial court’s findings ...,” our duty is to reverse. Ross v. State, 605 So.2d 17, 21 (Miss.1992). As in other cases in which the trial court must make factual determinations, our Court reviews those findings using the “clearly erroneous” standard. Stokes v. State, 548 So.2d 118, 122 (Miss.1989).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 5 So. 3d 496 - Williams v. State

3. “The inability to procure evidence vital to a proper completion of a criminal prosecution, as long as the evidence is pursued with some sort of reasonable measure of diligence, does not tend to establish the sort of bad faith delay tactics that call for the enforcement of the constitutional protections given under the Sixth Amendment.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Booker v. State