State v. Brooks’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 2 district · 29 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 33 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““In Bumper , police sought to justify their search of a house based on the owner’s consent, contending that she consented to the search by saying ‘[G]o ahead’ after police told her they had a warrant. Id. at 546 , 88 S.Ct. at 1790 . The Court held that this sort of submission to authority did not constitute consent. Id. at 548 , 88 S.Ct. at 1791-92 . The Court concluded that when a police officer claims authority to search a house under a warrant, ‘he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion — albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.’ Id. at 550 , 88 S.Ct. at 1792 . “Unlike Bumper , the Minnesota Legislature has given those who drive on Minnesota roads a right to refuse the chemical test. See Minn.Stat. § .52, subd. 1. If a driver refuses the test, the police are required to honor that refusal and not perform the test. Id. Although refusing the test comes with criminal penalties in Minnesota, the Supreme Court has made clear that while the choice to submit or refuse to take a chemical test “will not be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make,’ the criminal process ‘often requires suspects and defendants to make difficult choices.’ Neville, 459 U.S. at 564 , 103 S.Ct. 916 .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. McCoy v. North Dakota Department of Transportation

2. ““In South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), the Supreme Court held that a driver is not coerced into testifying against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment when the State introduces his refusal to submit to chemical tests into evidence in a criminal trial for driving under the influence. The Court concluded that ‘the State did not directly compel respondent to refuse the test, for it gave him the choice of submitting to the test or refusing.’ Id. at 562 , 103 S.Ct. at 922 . While the ‘choice to submit or refuse to take’ the test may be a ‘difficult’ one, the Court held that the decision was ‘not an act coerced by the officer.’ Id. at 564 , 103 S.Ct. at 923 . We followed the analysis in Neville when we held that Minnesota’s implied consent law, even though it makes it a crime to refuse testing, also does not coerce a driver into testifying against himself. McDonnell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848, 855-56 (Minn.1991).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. McCoy v. North Dakota Department of Transportation

3. “As a threshold matter, Brooks’s argument is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's discussion of implied consent laws in McNeely. As the Supreme Court recognized in McNeely, implied consent laws, which 'require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to [blood alcohol concentration] testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense,' are ‘legal tools’ states continue to have to enforce their drunk driving laws. The Court noted that these laws typically require suspected drunk drivers to take a test for the presence of alcohol and mandate that a driver’s license will be revoked if they refuse a test. By using this 'legal tool’ and revoking a driver’s license for refusing a test, a state is doing the exact thing Brooks claims it cannot do — conditioning the privilege of driving on agreeing to a warrantless search.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Flonnory v. State