838 So. 2d 413 - Smith v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘ “[T]he problem of jurors failing to disclose material information during voir dire is neither a recent development nor an unusual occurrence. In 1965 Dale Breeder published his seminal study on juror dishonesty during voir dire. The article included many case studies detailing why jurors fail to respond honestly during voir dire. For some jurors, the questions seemed too trivial to merit an honest response. Other jurors were simply too nervous to volunteer information during voir dire. For still others, the desire to serve outweighed the desire to tell the truth. One particular juror viewed selection as an honor and intended to use his jury experiences as a sübject of barroom conversation. More recent research indicates that approximately twenty-five percent of jurors fail to reveal material information during voir dire. “ ‘ “Given the high frequency with which jurors fail to disclose material information, it should come as no surprise that a showing of juror dishones-. ty, made after the trial, does not necessarily lead to the granting of a new trial. As Professor David Crump has noted, courts must balance two strong and competing interests: fairness and finality. In the criminal context, fairness means the right to impartial jurors, the right to the intelligent use of peremptory strikes, and the right to be free from juror misconduct. Courts will consider some combination, of these rights in deciding whether to grant a new trial.” “ ‘When Jurors Lie: Differing Standards”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Bennison v. State · McWhorter v. State

2. “"`[I]t is well settled that "a defendant has a right to cross-examine an accomplice as to the nature of any agreement he has with the government or any expectation or hope that he may have that he will be treated leniently in exchange for his cooperation. Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308 , 315-16 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 1109-10 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)." United States v. Barrett , 766 F.2d 609 , 614 (1st Cir.) (emphasis added [in Starks ]) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923 , 106 S.Ct. 258 , 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985). If the accomplice has entered into a plea bargain agreement with the State, "the full terms of this agreement must be allowed to be placed before the jury." Dawkins v. State , 494 So.2d 940 , 943 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986) (emphasis added [in Starks ]). The accomplice's agreement with the State has bearing on his credibility and bias. Id. Additionally, the terms of the agreement provide the jury with an "understanding] of the possible motivations of the accomplice as he sits on the stand." State v. Donelson , 302 N.W.2d 125 , 131 (Iowa 1981), quoted with approval in Dawkins v. State , 494 So.2d at 943 . Moreover, where, as in this case, the accomplice is a key witness, the trial court has little, if any, discretion to curtail an accused's attempts to show bias or motive on the part of the witness. See Jones v. State , 531 So.2d 1251 , 1254 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988); Proctor v. State , 331 So.2d 828 , 830 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976).' "Starks v. State , 594 So.2d 187 , 197 (Ala.Cr.App. 1991). "However, in t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 965 So. 2d 1112 - Jennings v. State

3. ““[Defense counsel]: ... We also bring to the Court’s attention that this prosecutor’s office has been reversed on many, many, many occasions for systematically excluding blacks. “THE COURT: I don’t agree with that, I really don’t. “[Defense counsel]: Judge, I have reversed them myself— “THE COURT: Many, many, many, many occasions? “[Defense counsel]: Many times. “THE COURT: This is [prosecutor,] a very prominent black attorney— “[Defense counsel]: Yes, sir, I understand that, Judge. “THE COURT: That I have worked with and you have too. “[Defense counsel]: Yes, sir. But also this same attorney came out in the paper, was quoted as saying that prosecutors do not use their strikes to eliminate blacks. And we feel like at least a pri-ma facie case has been made out. “THE COURT: Well, I respectfully call your attention to the record, Ms. G., the one that leans to the defendant; Ms. 0., who has a problem with capital punishment. Ms. H., who is nervous and doesn’t want to see the pictures, she’s on whatever that stuff is— [[Image here]] “THE COURT: And I have sat up here for 10 years and I know that — well, I don’t want to say too much because you will say I am putting words in their mouths. “[Defense counsel]: Yes, sir. “THE COURT: So I don’t want to say anything else but other than to decline to say that you have made a prima facie case, [defense counsel]. “[Defense counsel]: Even with the Hispanic, Judge and no— “THE COURT: I am going to stand pat and say that you have not made ou”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Smith v. State