Sharon O'Neal v. Constance Gonzalez’s Empirical Analysis
839 F.2d 1437 · 1988
Citation profile
14 federal appellate · 5 district · 9 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 42 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2018 · most notably 133 S. Ct. 1943 - Hillman v. Maretta (2013), Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Christ (1992)
14 federal appellate · 5 district · 9 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 5 U.S.C. § 8701 (Federal Employees Life Insurance Improvement Act) · 5 U.S.C. § 8705
Relies on Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers, Inc. v. United States · Huff v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · Sears v. Austin · Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Manning
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[t]his right cannot be waived or restricted.”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"O'Neal does not attempt to distinguish these cases, but rather points out the inequity of the results in McShan and Knowles as well as the inequity to O'Neal should this appeal be decided against her. "While the result may be harsh, the language and intent of the statute are clear. The statute was amended after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sears v. Austin , 292 F.2d 690 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 929 , 82 S.Ct. 365 , 7 L.Ed.2d 192 (1961), which held that a valid holographic will was effective to designate a beneficiary under a FEGLIA policy issued to one who had not previously designated a beneficiary. The Senate Report on the Amendment listed two reasons for the change: (1) administrative convenience; and (2) avoidance of serious delay in paying insurance benefits to survivors. The report also noted that the Amendment was intended to 'clarify Congress' intent [and] to state clearly that the order of precedence set out in that section shall prevail over any extraneous document designating a beneficiary. . . .' S.Rep. No. 1064, 89th Cong.2d Sess. reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. Admin. News 2070, 2071. This language indicates that Congress intended to establish, for reasons of administrative convenience and for the benefit of designated beneficiaries, an inflexible rule that the beneficiary designated in accordance with the statute would receive the policy proceeds, regardless of other documents or the equities in a particular case. "In addition to equitable consi”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“O'Neal contends that the Act and regulations merely set forth a procedure for disbursing the proceeds while conferring no substantive right of payment upon the designated beneficiary. To view the provisions in any other way, O'Neal argues, would imply that Congress intended to allow a federal employee to use what is meant to be a federal rule of procedure to intentionally disregard a contractual obligation made to a previously designated beneficiary.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.