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← 839 F.2d 392 - Richardson v. Penfold

Richardson v. Penfold’s Empirical Analysis

839 F.2d 392 · 1988

Citation profile

105
cited by 105 later decisions
July 1996
most recently cited

32 federal appellate ·

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Daniels v. Williams · Davidson v. Cannon · Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City · Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 105 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “It has long been established ... that negligence, evidenced by, inter alia, simple inattention or inadvertence, may not form the basis of an eighth amendment claim. A plaintiff must prove deliberate indifference, evidenced by either actual intent or reckless disregard. Although the term “actual intent” is self-explanatory, reckless disregard is not. A defendant acts recklessly when he disregards a substantial risk or danger that either is known to him or would be apparent to a reasonable person in his position. Recklessness is characterized by highly unreasonable conduct or a gross departure from ordinary care in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent. The standard is an objective one.... Accordingly, we have held, in the context of an alleged failure by correctional officials to protect a prison from the risk of attack, that the plaintiff must prove that the officials knew or had reason to know there was a “strong likelihood” that violence would occur. Where assaults occur so frequently as to be “pervasive,” a substantial risk of violence is apparent. Conversely, random acts of violence provide no basis for a finding of a substantial, forseeable risk of harm.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “Even if Dyer could not reasonably know that Birch raped Richardson the first time, a jury could reasonably conclude that he deliberately chose to allow Birch into Richardson’s cell after Richardson had already reported one rape and begged Dyer to protect him from another. Based on Staggers’s and Richardson’s allegations, a jury could have reasonably found that Dyer had shown indifference to the rapes of Richardson or a willingness to allow the attacks after learning of a strong likelihood that Richardson would be raped.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “a prison official will be liable for failing to protect an inmate form attacks if that official acts with 'deliberate indifference.'”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.