Willis v. Westerfield’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 31 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “depends upon whether it controverts an element of a plaintiff's prima facie case or raises matters outside the scope of the prima facie case.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Purcell v. OLD NATIONAL BANK · Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC v. Kephart

2. “In a negligence cause of action, the sudden emergency doctrine is an application of the general requirement that one's conduct conform to the standard of a reasonable person. The emergency is simply one of the circumstances to be considered in forming a judgment about an actor's fault. The doctrine was developed by the courts to recognize that a person confronted with sudden or unexpected circumstances calling for immediate action is not expected to exercise the judgment of one acting under normal circumstances. The basis of the doctrine is that the actor is left no time for adequate thought, or is reasonably so disturbed or excited that the actor cannot weigh alternative courses of action, and must make a speedy decision, based very largely upon impulse or guess. Under such conditions, the actor cannot reasonably be held to the same accuracy of judgment or conduct as one who has had full opportunity to reflect, even though it later appears that the actor made the wrong decision, one which no reasonable person could possibly have made after due deliberation. In Indiana, a defendant seeking a sudden emergency instruction must show that three factual prerequisites have been satisfied: 1) the defendant must not have created or brought about the emergency through his own negligence; 2) the danger or peril confronting the defendant must appear to be so imminent as to leave no time for deliberation; and 3) the defendant's apprehension of the peril must itself be reasonable.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Calvin B. Yates v. Rebecca Hites · Wanda Denson v. The Estate of Delmer Dillard and Indiana Farmers Mutual Insurance Company

3. “However, on medical matters which are within the common experience, observation, or knowledge of laymen, no expert testimony is required to permit a conclusion on causation .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Joseph Spaulding v. Joseph Cook (mem. dec.) · Buhring v. Tavoletti