Volume 84 — Connecticut Reports

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants, brought to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the jury before Peasley, J.; at the conclusion of all the evidence the trial court directed a verdict for the defendants, from the judgment on which the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by a husband, and for the loss of his wife’s services and society due to her injuries, alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to and heard in damages by the Superior Court in Fair-field County, George W. Wheeler, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

Appeals by the plaintiffs from orders of the railroad commissioners approving, with certain modifications, the action taken by the borough and town authorities, respectively, upon applications of the defendant for an acceptance and adoption of its plan of location in the highways of said town and borough, taken to the Superior Court in New Haven County and erased from the docket (Williams, J.) upon motion of the defendant, from which judgment the plaintiffs appealed.

Appeal by the plaintiffs from an order of the railroad commissioners designating and directing the method of construction of the Shore Line Electric Railway Company, taken to the Superior Court in New Haven County where a motion to erase the appeal was granted (Williams, /.), from which the plaintiffs appealed. This case, known as No. 6923, was argued in connection with the cases preceding, Nos. 6922 and 6924.

Action to recover damages for negligently running into and injuring the plaintiff with an automobile, brought to the Superior Court in Windham County and tried to the jury before Holcomb, J.; verdict for the plaintiff for $800 damages, which the trial judge refused to double upon motion of the plaintiff, from which refusal he appealed.

Suit to foreclose a mortgage of real estate, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, Coats, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

Writ op error to reverse an order of the City Court of New Haven (M'athewson, J.) adjudging the plaintiff guilty of contempt of court and requiring him to pay a fine of $25.

Suit to secure an accounting and distribution of certain insurance funds in the possession of the defendant corporation, alleged to belong in equity to the plaintiff and other members who had contributed thereto, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fair-field County, Curtis, Jupon a finding of facts, for the advice of this court.

Action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County where a demurrer to portions of the complaint was overruled (Case, J.), and the cause was afterward tried to the jury before Ralph Wheeler, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $400, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the bite of the defendant’s dog, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Bennett, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $250 damages, and appeal by the defendant.

Suit to foreclose a lien for benefits arising from the layout of a city street, brought by appeal of the defendants from a judgment of the City Court of Hartford to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Burpee, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, from which most of the defendants appealed.

<p>An unequivocal acknowledgment of an existing indebtedness is required in order to remove the bar of the statute of limitation; since it is only from such an acknowledgment that the law will imply a promise of payment.</p> <p>The defendant, an executor, in his administration account credited the plaintiff, a devisee, with a sum of money the payment of which was required by the terms of the devise, and also with a further sum amounting to about one fourth of the debts of the estate in excess of the value of the personal property available for their payment; which sums the defendant, acting in good faith but erroneously, informed the plaintiff she was bound to pay in order to entitle her to the devise. The Court of Probate treated the sum paid to discharge the debts of the estate as an overpayment which still remained in the hands of the executor, and the account was framed in compliance with such ruling. In an action for money had and received it was held:—</p> <p>1. That the items of the account relied upon as showing an acknowledgment upon the part of the defendant should be read not only in connection with all the others, but also in the light of the facts and circumstances under which they were made, as disclosed by the record.</p> <p>2. That as thus read, none of the items constituted an unequivocal acknowledgment of indebtedness, either past or present, since there was nothing to indicate that it was not the duty of the plaintiff, irrespective of any provision of the will, to pay her proportional part of the debts of the estate, nor any admission by the defendant that no such duty rested upon the plaintiff; while there was much in the record to indicate the contrary.</p> <p>Whether a statement by an executor in his administration account can ever properly be regarded as an acknowledgment or promise by him in his individual capacity to his personal creditor, quaere.</p> <p>A plaintiff who relies upon an acknowledgment or new promise of the defendant to avoid an answer of the statute of limitation, should plead it in his reply to suoh answer.</p>

Action to recover rent, and damages for alleged breaches of covenants in a lease, brought to the City-Court of New Haven and tried to the jury before Mathewson, J.; verdict and judgment for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court.

Indictment for murder in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Williams, Jverdict and judgment of guilty of murder in the second degree as to Pecciulis, and of manslaughter as to Sophie Kritchman, from which the former appealed.

<p>Action to recover damages for false arrest and imprisonmént, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Reed, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $50, from which the defendants appealed.</p> <p>The defendant Tehan was a policeman on duty in the city of Waterbury. An ordinance of that city enacted under authority of the city charter, which made the offense created by the ordinance a misdemeanor, forbade the assembly of persons idly and in crowds upon any footway, sidewalk or crosswalk, in any street, or in the public squares of the city; and provided that “all persons to the number of three or more assembled and refusing to disperse when commanded to do so by a police officer, special constable, alderman or mayor of said city, shall forfeit and pay a penalty of not more than fifty dollars for every such offense.”</p> <p>The plaintiff, who was then a minor, met two friends upon a sidewalk in the center of the city about eight o’clock one Saturday evening, and there stood in conversation for several minutes with them. His meeting with one of these friends was by appointment; with the other by chance. The sidewalkwas at the time crowded. Tehan, who had been specially detailed by the defendant Beach, who was the superintendant of police of the city, to keep clear the streets and walks in the vicinity, noticed from the opposite side of the street, where he was, the three young men standing as stated, and thereby interfering with free passage along the walk. He crossed the street and directed them to move on. They did not move immediately, and the plaintiff, who was intending to go to a theater with one of the group and might with equal propriety take either of two streets to reach there, asked this friend which way they shoidd go. Tehan, hearing this inquiry, and supposing that it was addressed to him, and because the plaintiff did not move at once, answered by saying, “I will show you which way to go,” and arrested him and took him as a prisoner to the police station.</p> <p>The arrest was made for the violation of the ordinance. There was no such violation by either of the three young men, and the plaintiff was not allowed a reasonable time within which to comply with the officer’s direction, before his arrest. Tehan believed that there was a violation of the ordinance, and acted in good faith.</p> <p>Tehan took the plaintiff directly to the station house, and there reported to the sergeant on duty at the desk. Here the plaintiff was weighed and measured, his name entered upon the records, and he was then locked up in the cell corridor. The defendant Beach was on duty as chief in authority, and in his office in an adjoining room. The plaintiff’s two companions followed to the station house, and there, without the plaintiff’s knowledge, sought, out Beach in his office, and requested that the plaintiff be discharged. Beach thereupon sent directions to the sergeant to release the plaintiff upon payment by one of the friends of $5. This sum was paid without the knowledge of the plaintiff, and he was then released. He was then told that if he wished to contest his arrest or have a hearing in court, he could appear on the following Monday morning. The first information that the plaintiff received of the action of his friends was after he had left the station house, when he was told that the matter had been settled by the payment of $5, and also that he could appear before the court on Monday morning, if he wished a hearing. The plaintiff was so agitated that the information that he could appear in court as stated made no impression upon his mind, and he never appeared there or before any authority.</p> <p>The plaintiff never waived his right to be presented, and never consented to his release any further than to go when told that he might. He was never placed under bonds, nor presented before competent authority.</p>

Action to secure the cancellation of a deed of real estate and a reconveyance of the premises, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Reed, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant. On April 17th, 1901, the plaintiff Mrs. Atwood was the owner in fee of the property in suit.

Action to recover moneys’paid as taxes upon land bought by the plaintiff’s assignor under a written agreement between it and the defendants, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Williams, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

<p>Action to recover damages for waste, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Williams, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $850, and appeal by the defendant.</p>

Suit in equity to settle and determine the rights of the parties in and to the sum of $4,000 in the hands of one of the defendants, and the validity and effect of a mortgage of real estate made by an heir at law prior to distribution, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Reed, J.; facts found and judgment rendered in favor of the defendant Downey, and appeal by one of the plaintiffs.

, upon the alleged ground that it did not comply with the advice of this court pursuant to which it purported to have been rendered.

Information for an assault with intent to commit rape, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Curtis, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused.

John Coats, judge of the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, and reserved by him, upon the facts found by a committee and remonstrances to his report, for the consideration and advice of this court.

<p>It is not error for the trial court, in giving instructions as to one ground of alleged negligence on the part of the defendant, to omit any reference to the subject of plaintiff’s contributory negligence, .where that subject is adequately treated elsewhere in the charge.</p> <p>A foot-passenger has a legal right to leave the sidewalk and walk in the roadway, and his conduct in doing so is neither negligent in law nor ‘prima facie evidence of negligence in fact; whether or not it is negligence depends upon the question whether, under all the cir- ,. cümstances of the case, his act was that of an ordinarily prudent person.</p> <p>In an action to recover for injuries due to a kick from a vicious horse belonging to the defendant which was left unattended in the street, the court charged the jury that if the owner of a horse more likely to kick than another puts him in a place where he is likely to injure others, that owner is bound to keep in mind his knowledge of the horse, and to take such care as the ordinarily prudent person would take under such circumstances. Held that this was a reasonably accurate statement of law for the purposes of the case, and one expressed in terms within the comprehension of the jury.</p> <p>Testimony of a certain witness, 0, was offered to the effect that a certain horse, which had not been properly identified as the one which caused the injury to the plaintiff, had kicked'at him, and the court admitted it over defendant’s objection; whether the defendant’s horse kicked was a vital issue in the case, and, apart from this testimony, the only evidence as to it was that of one other witness and an admission by the defendant; in its charge, the court stated as a fact that O had testified that the defendant’s horse kicked. Held:—</p> <p>1. That the testimony of 0 should have been excluded until the horse had been properly identified as that of the defendant, and its admission, under the circumstances of the case, was necessarily injurious to the defendant.</p> <p>2. That while ordinarily no harm can result from a misstatement in the charge as to evidence, for the jury will recollect and weigh the evidence and will not be misled, and, generally, a single bit of evidence will not be of controlling influence, in this instance the jury could hardly have failed to follow the court’s statement of O’s testimony, to the manifest prejudice of the defendant, and that therefore the instruction was erroneous.</p> <p>Testimony of a policeman that he had seen a chestnut horse thirty times standing in front of a place where the defendant was conducting building operations, and that he had seen the defendant driving a chestnut horse which looked like the horse which stood in front of this place, and it appeared that the defendant had only one chestnut horse and that it used to stand in front of this place, is a sufficient identification of the horse to admit proof of its viciousness in a case where this was an issue.</p> <p>Questions of identity of this nature are preliminary and usually rest within the discretion of the trial court; but whether or not the court has exercised a reasonable discretion is always open to review.</p> <p>Where testimony as to. a certain fact is apparently given from personal knowledge, but later appears to have been based on hearsay, a motion to strike it out should be granted; where, however, a number of other witnesses have testified to that fact and it is uncontested, no harm can result from permitting the testimony to remain as part of the evidence.</p>

<p>It is a well-established rule in the construction of wills, that the word “heirs" is to be given its strict, primary meaning — those entitled by law to inherit by descent the real estate of a deceased person— unless it clearly appears from the will itself, read in the light of the circumstances surrounding the testator, that he used it in a different sense; but, if that does clearly appear, the sense in which he used the word must prevail.</p> <p>A testator, in the eighth clause of his will, gave the life use of certain personal property to his daughter, and provided that at her decease the property should go to the issue of her body, if any, or, if she died without issue, to her “heirs at law.” By other provisions of the will he gave $1,000 to the executor for the purchase and erection of a monument, thé material and design of which were left to the executor’s discretion, and gave all the rest of his property either to his wife for life, with remainder to his daughter, or to his daughter absolutely, and named the husband of the daughter as executor. At the time his will was executed, the testator was sixty-eight years old, his wife was fifty-eight, and his daughter was twenty-three and in good health; he had a brother fifty-four years old, and his wife had two sisters, both of advanced age; none of the latter had any children with whom the testator was acquainted, and there were no heirs at law expectant of the daughter with whom the testator was acquainted. The testator died a few days after executing the will. The daughter thereafter died, leaving her husband surviving, but no issue, and, as her nearest blood relatives, the uncle and the two aunts above mentioned. In a suit to construe the will it was held that there was nothing in the provisions of the will, read in the light of the circumstances surrounding the testator, to indicate that the word “heirs” in the eighth clause was not used in its primary sense, and therefore the surviving husband took no share in the property included in that clause.</p>

Action to recover damages for injuries to the person and carriage of the plaintiff, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Greene, J.; verdict of $50 for the plaintiff, which the trial court, upon his motion, set aside as against the evidence, from which ruling the defendants appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Ralph Wheeler, Jverdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $1,500, and appeal by the defendant. The plaintiff at the time of his injury was a boy sixteen years and eight months of age. Leaving school at fifteen, he entered the service of the defendant as an apprentice.

Suit by minority stockholders to restrain the defendants from calling and holding a meeting of the stockholders of the Connecticut River Company for the purpose of passing upon the question of accepting an amendment of its charter granted by the General Assembly of this State, and from other corporate action, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Bennett, J.; the court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, and rendered judgment for the defendants,…

Applications in the nature of appeals from an assessment of special benefits for a public improvement, brought to and tried together by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Reed, J.; facts found and judgment rendered confirming the assessment as originally made, in one case with a substantial reduction, from which the respective plaintiffs appealed.

Action in the nature of interpleader, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Reed, J., upon demurrer to the substituted complaint; the court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint, from which judgment the plaintiff appealed.

<p>A duly-recorded and otherwise valid mortgage to secure future advances, is not to be subordinated to a mechanic’s lien for services and materials subsequently furnished, merely because the agreement respecting such advances — which was fully set forth in the mortgage deed — permitted the mortgagee to withhold payment of any one or more of the advancements, provided any lien or claim of lien against the property should exist at the time prescribed for making such payment. Such an element of uncertainty is a common feature of many mortgages, but does not render them invalid provided the real transaction is truly set forth therein and the deed is recorded in the land records for the information of subsequent incumbrancers and lienors.</p>

Action to recover for goods sold and delivered brought to the City Court of Meriden and thence by appeal of the plaintiff to the Superior Court in New Haven County, where the parties were at issue as to the effect upon the plaintiff’s claim of an adjudication and discharge in bankruptcy pleaded by the defendant; the court, Reed, J., upheld the plea and rendered judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover on an officer’s receipt for property attached, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Reed,facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $980, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the District Court of Waterbury and tried to the jury before Peasley, J.; verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $466, and appeal by the defendant.</p>

<p>Action for slander, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County and tried to the court, Simpson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.</p>

<p>Action in the nature of interpleader to determine the validity of a death-benefit certificate for $2,000 issued by the predecessor of the plaintiff, brought, to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the defendants were required to interplead (Reed, J.) and the cause was afterward tried to the court, Williams, J.; facts found and judgment rendered holding the certificate invalid, and appeal by the defendant Mary E. Burns.</p> <p>The Ancient Order of United Workmen of Connecticut is an incorporated fraternal insurance organization composed of duly-elected representatives of subordinate lodges, certain officers of the grand lodge, members of certain committees of the grand lodge, and past grand master workmen who are members in good standing of subordinate lodges under the jurisdiction of the grand lodge. The Grand Lodge of Massachusetts originally represented and had jurisdiction over the members of said Order in all the New England States.</p> <p>John W. Burns, late of Waterbury, deceased, who was the husband of Mary E. Burns, received, between 1890 and 1897, through his membership in, and upon his written application to, a subordinate lodge of Waterbury, known as America Lodge, No. 44, three successive certificates entitling him to participate in the benefit-fund to the amount of $2,000. The first and second certificates were surrendered by Burns for the purpose of changing the benéficiary, and the third, which is the certificate in question in this action, and in which his wife, Mary E. Burns, was made the sole beneficiary, was issued October 7th, 1897. These certificates were issued by authority of the Grand Lodge of Massachusetts, and were signed by its grand master workman, with its seal attached, and were countersigned by the master workman and the recorder of America Lodge, No. 44, with its seal attached, “rendering,” as stated therein, “this certificate valid and in full force.”</p> <p>The application of Burns to America Lodge, No. 44, upon which said certificates were issued, contained the following language: “I . . . hereby make application for the Workman degree in America Lodge, No. 44, of Waterbury, Conn., under the jurisdiction of the Grand Lodge of the Ancient Order of United Workmen of Massachusetts, and hereby agree that compliance on my part with all the laws, regulations and requirements which are or may be enacted by said Order, is the express condition upon which I am to be entitled to participate in the Beneficiary Fund, and have and enjoy all the other benefits and privileges of said Order.”</p> <p>Each of the three certificates states that Burns, “a Workman degree member of America Lodge, No. 44, of said order, ... is entitled to all the rights and privileges of membership in the Ancient Order of United Workmen and to participate in the beneficiary fund of the order to the amount of” $2,000 and that it “is issued upon the express condition that said John W. Burns shall in every particular while a member of said order comply with all the laws, rules and requirements thereof.”</p> <p>By the constitution and general laws of the Order, it is provided that the territory comprising a grand-lodge jurisdiction, having jurisdiction over more than one State, may be divided by the Supreme Lodge at a stated meeting into two or more grand-lodge jurisdictions.</p> <p>In 1901 the jurisdiction of the Grand Lodge of Massachusetts was divided into the jurisdiction of the Grand Lodge of Connecticut, and the Grand Lodge of Massachusetts, and the members of said Order within the State of Connecticut were placed under the jurisdiction of the Grand Lodge of Connecticut, and the obligations of the members residing in Connecticut transferred to the Grand Lodge of Connecticut, and Burns became a member of the Grand Lodge of Connecticut, which, in 1902, was incorporated under the laws of this State.</p> <p>When Burns became a member of the Order in 1890, there was no law or rule of the Order prohibiting a member from engaging in the business of selling intoxicating liquors as a beverage. After the issuing of the certificate of membership to Burns, the Grand Lodge of Massachusetts adopted a law providing that any officer or member tried and convicted of certain offenses, among which was entering into the business of selling, by retail, intoxicating liquors as a beverage, should be fined, suspended, or expelled.</p> <p>In 1891, soon after Burns became a member of the Grand Lodge of Connecticut, it provided by its constitution that no person should be admitted to membership in the Order who was engaged in the sale, by retail, of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, and adopted the following general law: “Any member of the Order who shall enter into the business or occupation of selling, by retail, intoxicating liquors as a beverage, shall stand suspended from any and all rights to participate in the Beneficiary Fund of the Order, and his Beneficiary Certificate shall become null and void from and after the date of his so engaging in said occupation, and no action of the Lodge of which he is a member, or of the Grand Lodge or any officer thereof, shall be necessary or a condition precedent of any such suspension. In case any assessment shall be received from a member who has thus engaged in such occupation, the receipt thereof shall not continue the Beneficiary Certificate of such member in force, nor shall it be a waiver of his so engaging in such occupation.”</p> <p>In September, 1907, Burns engaged in the business at Waterbury of selling, at retail, intoxicating liquors as a beverage, and continued said business until his death on the 2d of October, 1910.</p> <p>In a conversation with one Reynolds, the recorder of America Lodge, No. 44, Burns said that he had gone into the liquor business, and had dropped the Order. Reynolds made no report or record of such information until after the death of Burns, when he sent to Stroh, the grand recorder of the Grand Lodge, the notice of Burns’ death, and in the same letter informed Stroh that Burns had been engaged in the saloon business. By the report sent by Reynolds to the recorder of the Grand Lodge, a short time before Burns’ death, his name appeared upon the list of members of the lodge.</p> <p>Reynolds was called as a witness by counsel for Mrs. Burns, and on cross-examination was shown his letter to Stroh, and his attention called to a statement therein that Burns had told him (Reynolds) that he knew that his conduct in engaging in the liquor business was contrary to the laws of the Order, and Reynolds testified that he would not be positive that Burns told him he knew it was contrary to the laws of the Order. The letter was only admitted for the purpose of fixing the date when Reynolds gave the first notice to the Grand Lodge.</p> <p>From the time he became a member of the Order until his death in 1910, Burns paid to the financier of America Lodge, No. 44, the assessments as they were made by the Grand Lodge of Massachusetts, and as afterward made by the Grand Lodge of Connecticut, and said financier of America Lodge, No. 44, paid the same to the receiver of America Lodge, No. 44, who transmitted them to the proper officer of the Grand Lodge, as they were required by that lodge. In collecting and transmitting said funds, neither the financier nor the receiver of America Lodge, No. 44, knew of the fact that Burns was engaged in the liquor business, until after his death, nor did the officers of the Grand Lodge, unless the knowledge of Reynolds, the recorder of America Lodge, No. 44, of such fact, as before stated, is to be regarded as the knowledge of the Grand Lodge, or the grand recorder.</p> <p>The payments made by Burns to the financier of America Lodge, No. 44, after Burns engaged in the liquor business, amounted to $122. After the death of Burns, the further sum of $4.40, paid by him September 25th, 1910, and transmitted to the grand recorder of the Grand Lodge by the receiver of the America Lodge, with a letter stating that Burns, at the time of his death, was engaged in the liquor business, was repaid to the administrator of Burns.</p> <p>The evidence before us shows that the recorder Reynolds was an officer of and elected by the subordinate America Lodge, No. 44. It was his duty, on or before the first day of each month, to notify the grand recorder of all “expulsions of members”; of “the suspending, annulling, or canceling of beneficiary certificates”; to make due and proper record of all “suspensions”, and “expulsions”, upon the beneficiary certificate register of the lodge, and to see that the same were recorded at the proper time in the monthly report of the lodge, and to mail to the grand recorder, on or before the 5th day of each month, the monthly report of the lodge. It was the duty of the financier to make out the monthly report of the lodge upon the form provided by the Grand Lodge, and deliver the same to the recorder, and at the end of each term to furnish the recorder with a list of all members and their standing in the lodge.</p> <p>Both the Grand Lodge of Massachusetts and the Grand Lodge of Connecticut adopted the following general law: “The officers of subordinate lodges shall be, and are, the agents of the members of the Lodge to which they belong, in the transaction of all the official business required of them by the Constitution or these general laws, and are not agents of the Grand Lodge.”</p> <p>The plaintiff, which it is found holds the $2,000, holds it to bé paid to Mrs. Burns if said certificate of benefits is valid, and if not, then for the payment of other claims proper to be paid by the Grand Lodge.</p>

Petition for a writ of habeas corpus to determine the legality of the petitioner’s detention pending his delivery to an agent of the State of New York in compliance with a requisition from the Governor of that State, brought to and heard by the Hon. Howard B. Scott, judge of the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County, upon a demurrer to the return of the respondent; said judge overruled the demurrer, dismissed the petition and remanded the petitioner to the custody of the…

Action of interpleader to determine the rights of the respective defendants in and to a sum of money in the hands of the plaintiff, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County, Simpson, J.; facts found and judgment rendered awarding the money to the defendant Taniska, from which the other defendant, Majkowski, appealed.

Application in the nature of an appeal from an assessment of benefits resulting' from the repavement of a city street in front of the plaintiff’s premises, brought to and tried by the Court of Common Pleas in Fair-field County, Scott, J.; facts found and judgment rendered confirming the city’s assessment, from which the plaintiff appealed.

<p>Suit to determine the construction and validity of certain provisions in the will of Charles Cornell, late of the town of Fairfield, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Shumway, /., upon an agreed finding of facts, for the advice of this court.</p> <p>Charles Cornell died November 18th, 1883, domiciled in Fairfield, possessed of both real and personal property, and leaving a will executed May 7th, 1881, duly probated December 28th, 1883. Said Walter Cornell and Isaac B. Wilson were named as executors in said will, and resigned, and plaintiff was appointed administrator with the will annexed on September 21st, 1908, and duly qualified. The testator was survived by a widow, two sons, Walter Cornell and the defendant George W. Cornell, and two daughters, the defendants Fannie M. Seeley and Grace W. Cornell. The widow died in November, 1910. Said Walter Cornell died July 29th, 1909, and the defendant Frances A. Cornell has been appointed and qualified as administratrix of his estate. Said Fannie M. Seeley is married, having-no children. Said George W. Cornell has four children, all of whom were living when the testator died. One of said children, Alice B. Cornell, was born five days before the death of the testator, but said Charles Cornell never knew of her birth.</p> <p>The testator gave to his wife the use during her life of all his estate, and thereafter provided as follows:—</p> <p>“Art. 5. Upon the death of my said wife, I give to my son, George W. Cornell, ten dollars, which sum with that already advanced by me to him will make twelve hundred dollars.</p> <p>“Art. 6. I give to my son, Walter Cornell, twelve hundred dollars to be his forever.</p> <p>“Art. 7. I give to my daughter, Gracie W. Cornell, twelve hundred dollars to be hers forever.</p> <p>“Art. 8. I give to said Walter Cornell and Isaac B. Wilson eight hundred dollars to hold in trust for the following purposes, to wit: 1. To pay the income thereof to my daughter, Fannie M. Seeley, during her natural life. 2. Upon her death to divide and pay said sum of eight hundred dollars among and to her lawful issue and their descendants to be theirs in equal portions per stirpes forever. 3. But if she dies leaving no descendants living at that time, then said sum shall be divided among, and paid to, said Walter Cornell, Gracie W. Cornell and said Walter Cornell and Isaac B. Wilson, as trustees, for the use of said George W. Cornell, during his life, and upon his decease to his heirs forever in three equal portions share and share alike forever (said sum of eight hundred dollars with that already advanced by me to her, Fannie, will make twelve hundred dollars).</p> <p>“Art. 9. All the rest and residue of my estate then remaining I give and devise to said Walter Cornell and Isaac B. Wilson, as trustees, for the life use of said George W. Cornell, and upon his decease to his heirs forever, to said Walter Cornell and Isaac B. Wilson, as trustees, for the life use of said Fannie M. Seeley, and upon her decease to her descendants forever, if any, if not, to go as provided in like case in article eight (third section) above, and to said Walter Cornell and to said Gracie W. Cornell in four equal shares, or if any of them be dead leaving no living issue and descendants, then to the survivors of them share and share alike.”</p> <p>The questions upon which the advice of this court is asked are:—</p> <p>“(a). Whether that portion of Article 8 of the will which provides that the trust fund therein created for the benefit of Fannie M. Seeley shall, upon her death, be divided among her lawful issue and their descendants, is void, as being in contravention of the rule against perpetuities.</p> <p>“(b). Whether that portion of Article 8 of the will which provides that the trust fund therein created for the benefit of George W. Cornell, shall, upon his death, vest in his heirs, is void, as being in contravention of the rule against perpetuities.</p> <p>“(c). Whether that portion of Article 9 of the will which provides that the trust fund therein created for the benefit of George W. Cornell, shall, upon his death, go to his heirs, is void, as being in contravention of the rule against perpetuities.</p> <p>“(d). Whether that portion of Article 9 of the will which provides that the trust fund created therein for the benefit of Fannie M. Seeley, shall, upon her death, go to her descendants, is void, as being in contravention of the rule against perpetuities.”</p>

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New London County where the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial to the jury before Reed, J., and from the refusal to set aside such judg-ment the plaintiff appealed.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate and alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New London County where the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial to the jury before Reed, J., and from the refusal to set aside this judgment the plaintiff appealed.

<p>Having instructed the jury as to the elements essential to be proved by the State in order to constitute the crime of receiving and concealing stolen goods, the trial court later in its charge, in referring to the subject, omitted one of these elements. Held that this was a mere inadvertence which could not have harmed the accused.</p> <p>One of the three accused of the theft pleaded guilty and testified for the State. Held that this testimony, being that of a self-confessed thief, required corroboration, as the jury were instructed; but that it was not improper for the trial judge to call the attention of the jury, in this connection, to the fact that the witness was testifying after conviction, and so without hope of escaping punishment.</p> <p>It is not now the rule in this State that the testimony of every accomplice needs corroboration; corroboration is, however, required, if moral turpitude attaches to the offense.</p> <p>An instruction that certain testimony, if believed, would warrant the jury in finding that the accused had received and concealed a portion of the stolen property, is not open to the criticism that it removed from the jury’s consideration the question of the guilty knowledge of the accused.</p> <p>It is not necessary for the trial judge, in each reference to different portions of the evidence, to restate all the essential elements of the alleged crime, and his omission to do so furnishes no ground of error.</p> <p>Guilty knowledge upon the part of one accused of receiving and concealing stolen property can ordinarily be established only as an inference from other proved facts and circumstances; and such inference may be drawn by the jury provided the facts and circumstances upon which it is based are such that a reasonable man of honest intentions, in the situation of the accused, should have come to that conclusion.</p> <p>In determining this question of guilty knowledge the jury are entitled to consider not only the circumstances which surrounded the accused at the time he received the property, but his own conduct then and immediately thereafter with respect to such property.</p> <p>To “receive” stolen goods there must be an actual exclusive possession of them, although that may be taken by two or more persons jointly. In such a case the mere manual possession or concealment of the property by one, while the other is acting with him and standing by and seeing the property concealed, is a possession and concealment by both, although as to one the possession may be, in the eye of the law, constructive.</p>

Action against the guarantor of a lease,* to recover rent, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New London County, Shumway, Jfacts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs for $625, and appeal by the defendant.

Action in the nature of trespass qu. cl. fr., brought ,, by appeal of the defendant from a judgment of a justice of the peace to the Court of Co'mmon Pleas in New London County and tried to the court, Waller, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant, and appeal by the plaintiff.

<p>Loss or damage resulting to one from the performance of an act done at the request of another, • is a sufficient consideration for the latter’s promise of indemnity.</p> <p>A sale of wood and3 timber standing on land owned by the defendant, and a subsequent promise by the defendant to indemnify the vendees if they would cut the wood up to a certain line which in fact was upon land of the adjoining proprietor, are separate and distinct transactions.</p> <p>Under a counterclaim^ the use of which is regulated by § 612 of the General Statutes, a defendant cannot bring in for adjudication any matter (unless it be a subject of set-off) that is not so connected with the matter in controversy under the complaint that its consideration by the court is necessary for a determination of the rights of the parties as to that controversy.</p> <p>The plaintiffs sought to recover, under a contract of indemnity, for the loss sustained by them in the cutting of wood and timber up to a certain line staked out by the defendant as the northern boundary of his land, but which in fact was upon land of an adjoining proprietor. The defendant filed a counterclaim for trees of his which were cut by the plaintiffs outside of the tract over which they had acquired the right to cut, to which the plaintiffs demurred. Held that inasmuch as the plaintiffs’ case rested on contract and the defendant’s on tort, and there was no connection between them, the defendant could not recover on his counterclaim, and the demurrer was therefore properly sustained.</p> <p>Courts of equity exercised jurisdiction upon the subject of set-off before the enactment of the statute of George II, which first conferred upon courts of law power to do so.</p> <p>The adoption of the Practice Act has not deprived our courts of the power to allow an equitable set-off where the occasion requires it; but a claim arising from tort has never been brought within the application of this principle.</p> <p>The right of set-off, whether legal or equitable, has always been confined to rights arising from contract.</p>

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff’s intestate and the destruction of his property, brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County and tried to the jury before Shumway, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for 15,335, and appeal by the defendant from the refusal of the trial court to set aside the verdict as one against the evidence.

Action to recover damages for injuries to the plaintiff and his dwelling-house adjoining a highway, which were alleged to have been caused by the noise, vibration and dust arising from the operation by the defendants of a street railway in such highway, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County where a demurrer to the complaint was sustained (Burpee, J.) and judgment rendered for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed.

<p>Appeal from a judgment of the City Court of Hartford, taken by the defendant to the Superior Court in Hartford County and dismissed by that court, Bur-pee, J., upon a plea in abatement, from which judgment the defendant appealed.</p>

Action to recover damages for breach of contract, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the jury before Burpee, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $2,500, and appeal by the defendant.

Information for an assault with intent to murder, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Case, Jverdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused.

Action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Reed, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiff.

<p>Suit to determine the construction of a deed of trust, •brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Ralph Wheeler, J., upon the facts stated in the complaint, for the advice of this court.</p> <p>On November 29th, 1901, Mary T. Denton executed and delivered to the plaintiff a deed of trust, and at the same time delivered to it the property mentioned in the deed, amounting to about $90,000. The next day she married Lewis P. Sheldon, and they are two of the parties to this action. They have two children living, Huntington D. Sheldon and Suzanne S. Sheldon, minors, who are also parties to the action.</p> <p>The deed of trust, after providing that the plaintiff shall hold and manage the property therein described as a trust fund, and pay over to the grantor the net income during her life, and upon her decease pay over and convey the trust estate then in its hands to such children of hers as shall survive her, and, if no issue of hers survive her, then to pay it over to such persons or objects as she shall by her will appoint, and, if she leave no will, to her heirs, contains the following provisions: “Provided, however, that upon the request in writing of Henry L. Hotchkiss, Louis H. Bristol and Eugene S. Bristol and their successors to be appointed as hereinafter provided, or a majority of them, for the time being, said Union Trust Company shall pay over and convey the whole or any portion of the principal of said trust fund to the said Mary T. Denton to be hers absolutely. And provided, also, that upon the death, resignation or disability of either the said Henry L. Hotchkiss, Louis H. Bristol or Eugene S. Bristol, the remaining two of the three above named persons shall forthwith, with the consent and approval of the said Mary T. Denton in writing appoint a person to act with them as regards any such request in writing in the place and stead of the one dying, resigning or being disabled, with the same power and authority in all respects as he possessed in respect to any such written request and the appointment of a successor to a vacancy caused by death, resignation or disability.”</p> <p>Prior to April 2d, 1910, the plaintiff, upon the request of said Hotchkiss, Louis H. Bristol, and Eugene S. Bristol, or a majority of them, paid to Mrs. Sheldon sums amounting to about $16,000 out of the principal of the fund. On.April 2d, 1910, Eugene S. Bristol died. After his death no successor to him was ever appointed by Hotchldss and Louis H. Bristol, who survived him. On July 20th, 1910, Louis H. Bristol died. On December 15th, 1910, Hotchkiss, who survived both of the Bristols, delivered to the plaintiff a written request to pay Mrs. Sheldon $5,000 out of the principal fund. On February 17th, 1911, he delivered to them a writing appointing Lewis P. Sheldon and John W. Bristol to act with him as successors of said Louis H. and Eugene S. Bristol. This was accompanied by a written approval of the appointment of Mrs. Sheldon. On the same day said Hotchkiss, Lewis P. Sheldon and John W. Bristol, delivered to the plaintiff a written request that it pay Mrs. Sheldon $5,000, part of the principal of the fund. The plaintiff refused to pay in compliance with either of the written requests mentioned, and brought this action for advice as to the construction to be placed upon portions of the trust deed and as to its . duties in the premises. Henry L. Hotchkiss and John W. Bristol were made parties defendant.</p>

<p>Action to recover a balance due under a building contract, and also for the value of extra work in connection therewith, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Curtis, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $37,402, and appeal by the defendants.</p>

<p>A warranty deed of real estate, which purported to have been given for the consideration of $800 received to the full satisfaction of the grantor, provided that the deed should become void if the grantee neglected or refused to comply with the terms of a written agreement of the same date between the same parties, wherein the grantee covenanted, among other things, to pay the grantor $800 and to nurse and care for her in case she should become ill and unable to care for herself. Held:— '</p> <p>1. That the grantee took upon the delivery of the deed a vested estate defeasible upon a breach of the conditions subsequent.</p> <p>2. That the recital in the deed acknowledging receipt of $800 from the grantee was prima facie, though not conclusive, evidence of the fact of such payment; and that in reply to the plaintiffs’ evidence of nonpayment, the defendant might show that she had been excused from making the prescribed payment under such circumstances as would have estopped the grantor from attempting to enforce a forfeiture of the defendant’s title upon that ground.</p> <p>3. That the grantor’s heirs at law and the administrator on her estate had no greater right under the deed and agreement to demand a forfeiture than the grantor herself would have had had she survived.</p> <p>4. That the unintentional failure of the grantee to care for the grantor on one occasion when the latter was ill and away from home, did not constitute a wilful neglect upon her part nor furnish a just cause for defeating her title.</p> <p>The office of an equitable estoppel in pais is not to shut out but to let in the whole truth, and to show what equity and good conscience require under the particular circumstances of the case, irrespective of what might otherwise be the legal rights of the parties.</p> <p>A court of equity has power to relieve a party against the forfeiture or penalty incurred by the breach of a condition subsequent, when no wilful neglect on his part is shown, upon the principle that a legal right should not be taken advantage of for the purpose of injustice and oppression.</p>

<p>An apparently thoughtless remark made by a juror to a witness during the trial, without any wrongful motive or intent, will not warrant a new trial to the defeated party unless the remark indicates such a prejudice or bias as to disqualify the juror in the proper performance of his duty.</p> <p>During a criminal trial the chief witness for the State, who had been on the stand for nearly two days, on returning to the court-room after the noon recess met one of the jurors who congratulated her ,. on her good appearance, and inquired if the woman who accompanied her was her mother, to which she replied in the affirmative and went on into the court-room. Held that the trial court did not exceed the limits of its discretion in refusing to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial for that irregularity or impropriety.</p> <p>This court will not undertake to set aside the action of the court below upon petition for a new trial, unless it appears from the record that the discretion vested in that court in such matter has been abused.</p>

Application in the nature of an appeal from the refusal of the board of relief of the town of Bloomfield to rule that land in said town owned by the plaintiff as part of its water system was exempt from taxation, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Bennett, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

<p>Action to recover damages for negligently causing the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County where the plaintiff was nonsuited in a trial to the jury before Williams, ./., from which judgment he appealed.</p> <p>The evidence offered by the plaintiff tended to establish the following facts:—</p> <p>A single line of the defendant’s tracks extended in a slight curve around the east end of Rimmon Pond upon an artificial embankment, which at the place of accident was twenty-five feet higher than the surface of the water and declined rapidly to the water’s edge. Approaching from the north, a second line of tracks joined the line already referred to upon this embankment and immediately opposite the pond. Connection was made by the use of an automatic switch. The point of the switch was next to the westernmost rail, which ran along within about four feet of the edge of the embankment. Southerly of this point there was a guard-rail laid easterly of the west rail and about two or three inches therefrom. The purpose of this rail was to prevent derailments of cars to the outer side of the curve in the tracks, being the side farthest from the pond. There was no such rail to serve a similar purpose on the opposite or pond side; neither was there a fence or other construction on that side to interpose an obstacle to the progress of a derailed car down the embankment into the pond. At a distance northerly of the point of the switch, which one map showed to be one hundred and ten feet and another one hundred and seventy-six feet, was a signal-box used by conductors in running their cars.</p> <p>During the afternoon of December 25th, 1909, there began a heavy fall of snow, accompanied with wind, which continued through the succeeding night and into the forenoon of the 26th. In all the total fall, variously estimated, was from ten to fifteen inches. Snowplows were called into service by the defendant, and its cars were operated during the night with more or less difficulty.</p> <p>During the forenoon of December 26th, the plaintiff’s intestate was sent out as a conductor in charge of a car going south, whose destination was Derby. When his car reached the signal-box referred to, it stopped, and the intestate went to the box and returned to the car by the front door leading into the front vestibule. The car then proceeded at a moderate rate of speed along the embankment until it reached a point at or a short distance beyond the point of the switch, when it left the rails and plunged headlong down the embankment into the water. The front end of the car was wholly submerged, and about two thirds of it under water. The few passengers were rescued, but the lifeless bodies of the motorman and conductor were taken from the front vestibule, the doors of which were found closed. The body of the motorman was found in a standing position at the controller box, and that of the conductor "down in a heap” on the floor.</p> <p>Other pertinent facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>A street-railway company which owns and maintains an amusement park for its patrons and the public, in order to hold and increase its traffic, is bound — like any one else who invites people to come upon his premises for business or pleasure — to exercise reasonable care to have and keep its grounds, and the structures and appliances thereon, reasonably safe for such visitors; and it makes no. difference as to the company’s liability whether an admission fee is charged or not, or whether the structures and appliances are leased to others who operate and control them subject to the company's general supervision.</p> <p>The engine on a miniature railway, which was one of the attractions of an amusement park owned and maintained by the defendant, ran off the track and struck and injured the plaintiff, who, with others, was standing nearby on a concrete pavement provided by the defendant in part for that purpose, listening to a band concert furnished by the defendant. No guard-rail protected the curve where the engine jumped the track, nor were there any warning signs to indicate danger, and the track and road-bed were in bad condition. The engine had frequently left the track at another curve, and to prevent this a guard-rail had been put in at that point. Held that the plaintiff’s evidence would have justified the jury in concluding that the accident was due either to the defendant’s failure to use reasonable care to see that the miniature railway was so built, maintained and operated as not to expose visitors to the park to injury, or to its failure to warn the plaintiff of the liability of the engine to leave the track, and therefore the plaintiff should not have been nonsuited.</p> <p>Whether the plaintiff, being in the place to which the defendant had invited him, had not the right to assume that the defendant had discharged its legal duty in making it reasonably safe, qucere.</p>

Suit to determine the construction of the will of George Atwater of the town of Hamden, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Ralph Wheeler, J., upon the facts alleged in the complaint, for the advice of this court.

Action to recover damages for an alleged breach of contract, and also for extra labor and material, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Williams, ./.; facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants, and appeal by the plaintiffs, who were the executors of the original plaintiff.

of the defendant’s intestate, to the plaintiff, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Reed, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.

Writ of habeas corpus to determine the legality of the plaintiff’s imprisonment, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New Haven County, Williams, J.; facts found and judgment rendered dismissing the writ, from which the plaintiff appealed. The plaintiff was on January 6th, 1911, convicted in the Criminal Court of Common Pleas in New Haven County of keeping a disorderly house, and sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail.

<p>Action in the nature of ejectment, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Greene, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant for alleged errors in the charge and rulings of thé court.</p>

Plea in abatement in this court alleging that an appeal taken by the defendant from the refusal of the Superior Court in New Haven County, Greene, J., to set aside-a verdict' for the plaintiff, was not seasonably taken, to the reply to which the plaintiff demurred.

<p>Appeal from an order of the railroad commissioners authorizing the construction, maintenance and operation of a side track, at grade, across Hamilton Avenue in the city of Waterbury, to be used by a manufacturing company for switching purposes only, taken by the city of Waterbury to, and tried by, the Superior Court in New Haven County, Reed, J.; facts found and judgment rendered confirming the action of the railroad commissioners,' and appeal by the appellant.</p>

; judgment rendered affirming the order of the railroad commissioners, and appeal to this court by Joseph J. Nolan and others, citizens and taxpayers of the city of Waterbury.

Action to obtain a divorce upon the ground of desertion, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Gager, J.; facts found and judgment of divorce rendered, and appeal by the defendant.

Complaint against the defendant, a member of the Fairfield County Bar, for professional misconduct in exacting an extortionate fee from his ward and client, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in said county, Burpee, J.; facts found and judgment rendered suspending the defendant from practice in this State for the period of two years, from which he appealed.

Appeal by the plaintiff from an order and decree of the Court of Probate for the district of Bridgeport disallowing a payment of $242 from the estate of his ward, made by him as guardian to himself as attorney, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Fairfield County, Burpee, J.; facts found and judgment rendered confirming the action of the Court of Probate, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Action for the conversion of two horses and other personal property, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the jury before Scott, J.; verdict and judgment for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendant.

Action against a nonresident stockholder of an alleged insolvent corporation of this State, to recover the amount of an unsatisfied judgment rendered against it, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and erased from the docket {Ralph Wheeler, J.) for want of jurisdiction, upon motion of the defendant, who had appeared specially, from which judgment the plaintiff appealed.

<p>General Statutes, § 1099, provides, among other things, that any person who shall conceal, remove or convey away any part of his estate with intent to prevent it from being taken by legal process, shall be liable to any creditor who is aggrieved thereby in an action of tort, in which the debtor’s body may be attached and taken on execution. Held:—</p> <p>1. That the conveyance of real, as well as of personal, estate, with the intent to prevent its being taken on legal process, came within the terms and purview of the statute.</p> <p>2. That the remedy thus provided could be resorted to only by a creditor who was “aggrieved,” that is, damaged by the fraud; but that the hindrance, delay and expense to which the creditor was put by reason of such a conveyance, and to which ho would not otherwise have been subjected in collecting his debt, constituted a sufficient grievance or damage to enable him to maintain the action. Although fraud is the gist of such an action, its real purpose is the collection of the debt.</p> <p>It is a question for the jury whether a conveyance of a valuable leasehold interest, made without consideration by a debtor to his near relatives, was fraudulent or not.</p>

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant’s negligence, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the jury before Ralph Wheeler, J verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $2,500, and appeal by the defendant.

Information for unlawfully killing two duly-registered and licensed dogs, brought to the Superior Court in Tolland County and tried to the jury before Greene, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, and appeal by the accused.

<p>Suit to restrain the defendant town from taking a strip of land, alleged to be owned by the plaintiff, for highway uses, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Bennett, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant.</p> <p>Three other cases against the same defendant, similar in their facts, were tried and determined at the same time in favor of the respective plaintiffs.</p> <p>The plaintiffs own land on the south side of Farming-ton Avenue in the town of West Hartford. On February 7th, 1900, a proprietor of land adjoining this avenue made written application to the selectmen of said town for the establishment of the bounds of said avenue, which had become lost and uncertain. Thereupon the selectmen caused to be printed a notice, in conformity with the statute (now General Statutes, § 2083), of the place and time when and where all parties in interest might be heard.</p> <p>The statute (§ 2083) provides that upon such application the selectmen “may cause to be made a map of such, highway, showing the fences and bounds as actually existing, and the bounds as claimed by adjoining proprietors, and shall also cause to be placed on said map such lines as in their judgment coincide with the lines of the highway as originally laid down.”</p> <p>After this application the selectmen prepared no map, but had at that time in their possession a map of said avenue, including the portion in question, prepared in 1898, without reference to § 2083. This map did not show the fences and bounds as claimed by adjoining proprietors. It contained one line only as the south line of said avenue, with nothing to show how it affected adjoining proprietors.</p> <p>The lines of the highway on the map are those which, in the judgment of the selectmen, coincided with the lines of the highway as originally laid down, but there was nothing on the map to indicate this. In fact the true south line of the avenue at this point runs about two and one half feet north of the south line indicated on the map.</p> <p>The selectmen did not send any notice of said hearing to the plaintiffs, nor did they receive notice of the same by publication or otherwise. The hearing was duly held, but none of the plaintiffs were present or represented.</p> <p>The selectmen caused a notice of their decision to be printed in conformity with the statute, but did not send notice of their decision to the plaintiffs, nor had they notice or knowledge of the same. The decision adopted, as the lines of the highway, the lines on said map, the south line of which varied from the true line by about two and one half feet.</p> <p>The town voted, in the spring of 1909, to adopt certain plans for lowering the grade of the highway in front of plaintiffs’ premises. Said plans, if carried out, would lower the grade of the highway and extend the south line about two and one half feet south of the true south line, making it correspond with the south line as attempted to be established by the decision.</p> <p>The plaintiffs learned of the proceedings for the re-establishment of the lines of the highway, and of the decision of the selectmen, in the spring of 1909.</p> <p>On September 4th, 1909, the town and State entered into a contract to change the grade of said avenue in accordance with said plans. On November 5th, 1909, this action was begun. If carried out, these plans would take for highway purposes a strip of the plaintiffs’ land adjoining the avenue on the south for its entire length, and would greatly disfigure and render unsightly and inaccessible their property, and cause them irreparable damage.</p>

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County and tried to the court, Williams, ./., upon a demurrer to the complaint; the court sustained the demurrer and rendered judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.

Appeal by the plaintiff from certain orders and decrees of the Court of Probate for the district of Hartford, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Hartford County, Williams, J.; facts found and judgment rendered affoming the action of the Court of Probate, from which the plaintiff appealed.

Bostwick, late of New Milford, deceased, and involving the construction of her will, taken to and tried by the Superior Court in Litchfield County, Case, Jfacts found and judgment rendered confirming in part and setting aside in part the decree of the Court of Probate, from which the plaintiffs and St. John’s Parish appealed.

Action to compel one of the defendants to reconvey to the other certain real estate which the former had received of the latter without consideration, and which constituted the sole means of support of the grantor and his wife, who were aged and infirm and likely to become paupers and a financial burden upon the plaintiff town, and for other relief, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Litchfield County where a demurrer to the complaint was sustained (Welch, J.) and…

Suit to determine the validity and construction of the will of Lorenzo Webster of Rockville, deceased, brought to and reserved by the Superior Court in Tolland County, Shumway, J., upon the facts alleged in the complaint, for the advice of this court.

<p>General Statutes, § 4670, provides that no person shall keep a maternity hospital, or lying-in place, until he has obtained a license therefor “duly issued” by the mayor or board of health of the city, or health officer of the town, in which such hospital is located. Held:—</p> <p>1. That in the exercise of its functions the licensing authority was invested with a reasonable discretion, and therefore could not be compelled by mandamus to issue a license to everybody who might apply for one regardless of the applicant’s character and moral fitness or the suitability of the proposed location.</p> <p>2. That the petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the issue of such a license, should allege that the petitioner is a suitable person and that the respondent, in refusing him a license, did not exercise a reasonable discretion; otherwise a motion to quash and dismiss the alternative writ should be granted.</p>

Action by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover a balance alleged to be due a bankrupt stockbroker for purchases and sales of stocks and grain on margin, brought to and tried by the Superior Court in New London County, Reed, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $2,887, and appeal by the defendant.

Action to recover an alleged balance due on a contract for the improvement of the defendant’s premises, and also the reasonable worth or value of extra work and labor, brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield County and referred to a committee who heard the parties and reported the facts; the court, Williams, J., overruled a remonstrance of the defendant, accepted the report of the committee, and rendered judgment for the plaintiff for $5,153, from which the defendant…

<p>Bankruptcy proceedings against an alleged insolvent corporation, begun within four months after an application to a State court for the appointment of a receiver of its assets, suspend the further administration of the assets in the State court.</p> <p>A receiver or trustee in bankruptcy so appointed by the Federal court is entitled to the custody of the assets of the alleged bankrupt in the custody of the State court in such a receivership proceeding.</p> <p>The State receiver should deliver the assets of the alleged bankrupt to the Federal receiver or trustee, only upon an order of court.</p> <p>Whether the Federal court can make such an order, valid against the receiver of a State court, qucere. (See cases below.)</p> <p>Upon the application of the Federal trustee or receiver to the State court for the delivery to him of the assets of the alleged bankrupt, the State court will settle the account of its receiver and order the balance of the assets to be delivered to the Federal receiver or trustee.</p>