84 Md. App. 384 - Grubb Contractors v. Abbott’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Turning to the legislative intent, we glean from the preamble to chapter 251 quoted previously that the Legislature intended in limited situations to shift the risk of loss from the owner of a single family dwelling to the subcontractor. The enactment of § 9-114 under chapter 251 in 1982 further evidences the Legislature’s intent to ameliorate owner liability. This new section indicates that the burden for negligent paying will no longer be borne by the owner.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 135 Md. App. 247 - Ridge Heating, Air Conditioning & Plumbing, Inc. v. Brennen · 108 Md. App. 381 - Best Drywall, Inc. v. Berry

2. ““Single family dwelling” is not defined in the mechanic’s lien statute; nor did we find any cases in Maryland that define the term. We need, therefore, to ascertain the meaning the Legislature attached to that term as used in the statute. In search of that meaning, we need to ferret out the “ ‘general purpose, aim or policy1 ” of the statute. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987) (citation omitted). When interpreting legislation, we look to the plain meaning of the words and, if clear, that generally completes our inquiry. The plain meaning rule, however, is not inflexible. As the Court of Appeals observed in Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 308 Md. 69, 75 , 517 A.2d 730 (1986): “We also recognize the rale that where a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment. In such circumstances, the court, in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, may consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.” (Citations omitted.) “[T]he plain-meaning rule does not force us to read legislative provisions in rote fashion and in isolation. What we are engaged in is the divination of legislative purpo”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 108 Md. App. 381 - Best Drywall, Inc. v. Berry

3. “in seeking to protect the owner of a single family dwelling the Legislature sought to protect the family by limiting the exposure of their residence to the potential liability of a mechanic’s lien as opposed to protecting the commercial enterprise of multiple family dwellings. [T]he traditional family ... has never excluded aged parents, many of whom are dependent in some way—economic, physical or emotional—or can reasonably be expected to become so. The inclusion of Mr. Abbott’s mother as a permanent resident does not make this two families, but a single family, with a single dwelling, and the Abbotts fall within the class of owners the statute sought to protect.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 108 Md. App. 381 - Best Drywall, Inc. v. Berry