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← 84 Md. App. 397 - Kennedy v. Mobay Corp.

84 Md. App. 397 - Kennedy v. Mobay Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

1990

Citation profile

44
cited by 44 later decisions
6
states following
June 2018
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 6 district · 30 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 44 later decisions — most recently June 2018 · most notably Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos (1992), 428 Pa. Super. 167 - Phillips v. A.P. Green Refractories Co. (1993)

4 federal appellate · 6 district · 30 state decisions

240199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp. · Jackson v. Bair · Alm v. Aluminum Co. of America · Werner v. Upjohn Co. · Moran v. Fabergé, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Celotex’s proffer of proof on this issue, however, does not address one critical point: whether Celotex knew the extent of duPont’s knowledge during or prior to the period of the plaintiffs’ exposure. Celotex may not escape liability by reconstructing the past to show merely what the employer/purchaser knew. Comment n clearly focuses on what the product manufacturer knew and the reasonableness of its reliance on the employer prior to and during the time the workers were exposed. Moreover, Celotex offers no evidence that it apprised duPont of the dangers of the insulation or that it attempted to ascertain whether duPont could reasonably be relied upon to disseminate information about the dangers of the product. The fact that an employer possesses knowledge of a product’s dangers does not extinguish the manufacturer’s liability unless the manufacturer can also show that it had reason to believe that the employer was or would be acting to protect the employees. Celotex has made no such showing here.””
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “The extension of workplace warnings liability unguided by practical consideration has the unreasonable potential to impose absolute liability in those situations where it is impossible for the manufacturer to warn the product user directly. In the workplace setting, the product manufacturer often cannot communicate the necessary safety information to product users in a manner that will result in reduction of risk. Only the employer is in a position to ensure workplace safety by training, supervision and use of proper safety equipment. Designating the manufacturer an absolute insurer of its product removes the economic incentives that encourage employers to protect the safety of their employees.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““(1) the dangerous condition of the product; (2) the purpose for which the product is used; (3) the form of any warnings given; (4) the reliability of the third party as a conduit of necessary information about the product; (5) the magnitude of the risk involved; and (6) the burdens imposed on the supplier by requiring that he directly warn all users.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.