concurrence">M. F. Cavanagh, J.

(concurring separately). I concur separately with the majority’s reversal of the accelerated judgment entered below. I do not agree that to do so in this case we must decide whether the two (MCL 600.5805[3]; MSA 27A.5805[3]) or the three (MCL 600.5805[7]; MSA 27A.5805[7]) year statute of limitations applies in wrongful death suits where the alleged wrong is medical malpractice.1

*496Because this action is based upon an alleged act of malpractice, my brothers seem to lose sight of the fact that it is, nonetheless, still a suit for wrongful death. As such, the statute of limitations cannot start to run until the date of death. It was clearly so stated by our Supreme Court in Coury v General Motors Corp, 376 Mich 248, 251; 137 NW2d 134 (1965), to wit:

"In Ford v Maney’s Estate, 251 Mich 461 [232 NW 393 (1930)] (70 ALR 1315), the action was under the so-called survival statute. In distinguishing between the 2 acts, the Court made the observation that:

" 'In this State it is held that the death act created a cause of action unknown to the common law, not by way of survival of a right accruing to the deceased which before had abated at this death, but as a new and special remedy accruing to those who suffer loss by the death.’

"It follows that in Michigan application of the above indicated prevailing view set forth in the ALR reference requires our holding and we think we should hold that the cause of action for a wrongful death and damages resulting therefrom accrues when that death occurs.”

The majority’s application of the rule enunciated in Dyke v Richard, 390 Mich 739, 747; 213 NW2d 185 (1973), to a wrongful death action could result in an action being barred (because not seasonably filed) before the plaintiff had any right to commence the action. I am not in accord with such an application and reiterate that it is unnecessary in this case. The date of death in the instant case was July 20, 1974, and this action was commenced on July 19, 1976. Whichever of the two possible *497limitation periods is correct, since this action was brought within the shorter of the two, the grant of accelerated judgment below was error and I would reverse.

In light of the lengthy opinion in Castle v Lockwood-MacDonald Hospital, 40 Mich App 597; 199 NW2d 252 (1972), discussing another issue, the Court’s application of the two-year statute of limitations there appears perfunctory. I believe it would be a mistake to expand the Court’s limited holding in this regard. It should also be noted that *496in Castle, supra,suit was commenced more than two years after the death of the decedent. In the instant case suit was commenced within two years of the decedent’s death.

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