¶1Suit upon a negotiable intrument by an indorsee thereof. There was judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
¶2Defendant- alleges that the payee’s agent induced Mm to become so intoxicated that he was incapable of understanding the legal effect of said instrument, and while in that condition he signed the note without knowing or comprehending its force or nature; that the note was given for a pretended right to vend a patented invention, but does not contain the statement that it was “given *810for a patent right,” as required by law, and was and is void and without consideration, and that plaintiff at the time he took said note and received an assignment thereof had knowledge of the aforesaid facts. The reply is a general denial.
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¶7The note in suit is payable to the Leader Fence Machine Manufacturing Company, or bearer, and Fordyce seems to have been the general manager of that company. The evidence tends to prove that, about a week before the note Avas signed, Fordyce induced defendant to sign two contracts wherein he agreed to purchase several fence machines from said company and to act as its exclusive agent for at least a year for the sale of said machines in three townships in Johnson county. Each writing recites that the defendant has given his obligation to pay for the machines purchased. Defendant refused to give his notes, but later, in Sterling, Avas plied by Fordyce Avith whiskey until intoxicated, and, while incapable of understanding what he Avas doing, was induced by Fordyce to sign the instrument in suit. Section 9395, Ann. St. 1907, provides that there shall be written or printed above the signature and across the face of all notes given in consideration of the right to make, use or vend a patented invention, or an invention claimed to be patented, the Avords “Given for a patent right,” and that such an instrument shall at all times be subject to all defenses *813available against the payee thereof, and if any snch notes are not thus indorsed, bnt a subsequent holder thereof has knowledge of the consideration therefor, he shall hold it subject to said defenses. The legislature in the exercise of the police power may enact statutes like the one quoted, and individuals dealing in negotiable instruments must take notice of the law. Tod v. Wick Bros. & Co., 36 Ohio St. 370; Allen v. Riley, 203 U. S. 347; Woods & Sons v. Carl, 203 U. S. 358. The proof is not as satisfactory as a court might desire to establish that the machine referred to in the contract was patented, that Fordyce claimed it to be patented, or that plaintiff knew either fact at or before the date he took the note in suit as collateral, but the evidence is not entirely without probative value to support those issues. If, therefore, the note was given for the right to use or vend a patented invention, or one that Fordyce claimed to be patented, and plaintiff knew that fact at or before the time he purchased the instrument, defendant had the right to have the jury consider his defense that, at the time he signed said instrument, he was so intoxicated by Forydce’s procurement, that he did hot know or understand the character or consequences of his act, and that he had repudiated the note within a reasonable time after recovering his senses. Between the original parties, or one not a bona fide holder, that defense is legitimate. Gore v. Gibson, 13 Mees. & Wels. (Eng.) 623; Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Meyers, 78 Neb. 685. It should be borne in mind, however, that plaintiff is not to be defeated because the facts may satisfy the trier of fact that Benton had constructive notice that the note was given in consideration of a right to use or vend a patented invention. The language of the statute is, that the indorsee is not an innocent holder if he purchased the note “knowing it to have been given for the consideration aforesaid.”
¶8Over defendant’s objections it was shoAvn that Fordyce, about 15 to 30 days after he secured the note from defendant, told the Avitness that he, Fordyce, “got Sikyta *814drunk when he signed the note, … so drunk that he could scarcely move or handle himself at all.” At the time the note was executed Fordyce was the payee’s agent, and, unless he owned the note when he made that statement, it ought not to have been received except for impeachment purposes, if Fordyce had testified and the proper foundation had been laid. Gale Sulky Harrow Co. v. Laughlin, 31 Neb. 103. The evidence does not fix with any degree of certainty just when Fordyce became the owner of the paper. BTe transferred it before maturity, and the jury might infer, from all of the circumstances developed from the evidence, that his title antedated the declaration made; but we think that the jury should have been advised that, unless they found that fact to exist, they should disregard Benton’s testimony on this point. The courts are not in harmony upon the admissibility of such evidence in any event, but the dictum of Judge Sullivan in Zobel v. Bauersachs, 55 Neb. 20, indicates the inclination of this court to hold such evidence competent where the litigant claims title through the declarant.and is not an innocent holder, and such we hold to be the law. Fisher v. Leland, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 456; Reed v. Vancleve, 3 Dutch. (N. J.) 352; Thorp v. Goewey, Adndr, 85 Ill. 611; Remy v. Duffee, 4 Ala. 365. The authorities cited on this point by plaintiff all support the proposition that the statements made by one who theretofore owned a negotiable instrument will not be received to impeach the bill, and they are sound, but do not apply to the case before us.
¶9For the errors referred to, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded.
¶10Reversed.