Mason v. Mason’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) any person whp has reached his eighteenth birthday shall be considered to have reached his majority and is an adult for all purposes the same as if he had reached his twenty-first birthday; (2) any law conferring any right or privilege, or imposing any duty or obligation, upon any person who has reached his twenty-first birthday shall apply to any person who has reached his eighteenth birthday; (3) any law which denies any right or privilege to persons who have not reached their twenty-first birthday shall apply only to persons who have not reached their eighteenth birthday; and (4) any law, except the Liquor Control Act [§§ 46-1-1 to 46-11-4], which differentiates between treatment to be accorded persons who have reached their twenty-first birthday and those who have not, shall differentiate between treatment to be accorded persons who have reached their eighteenth birthday and those who have not. B. It is the intent of the legislature that this general law shall control over any conflicting prior special law except that it shall not apply to or change any age requirements for exercising the elective franchise.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Peterson v. Romero · Phelps v. Phelps

2. ““ . . . Clearly this language cannot be said to be synonymous with twenty-one years of age, or to imply an intent on the part of the parties that the payments on - behalf of each child should continue until that child attained the age of twenty-one years. Minority, in the sense of our concern here, is a legal status conditioned primarily upon age. [Citations omitted]. However, the existence of this status is not conditioned entirely upon age, and certainly not in the sense in which it was used in the stipulation. It is clear that the parties intended plaintiff should be responsible for support payments on behalf of a particular child only so long as the child should remain unmarried or otherwise unemancipated and then only until he or she attained the age of majority. It was plaintiff’s duty under the law to support his children during their minority. [Citations omitted]. However, marriage and other conditions may earlier emancipate a child from his or her status of minority, and thus relieve a parent from the legal obligation of support before the age of majority is attained by the child.” 507 P.2d at 784 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 21 Ariz. App. 101 - Ruhsam v. Ruhsam

3. ““Robin and O’Brien were emancipated by the provisions of § 13-13-1, supra, from their theretofore existing status of minority. Thereupon plaintiff was relieved by the express language of the stipulation from making further support payments to defendant on behalf of these two children.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Phelps v. Phelps