Smith v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “| fiIt is well-settled that Louisiana’s sex offender registration requirements are not punitive, but rather, they are remedial and may be applied retroactively without violating the prohibition of the ex post facto clause. In State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 00-172 (La.2/21/01), 779 So.2d 735 , this court considered an ex post facto challenge to the sex offender registration provisions. We resolved the issue by holding the registration and notification requirements imposed upon sex offenders to be a legitimate, non-punitive regulatory scheme that did not impose punishment. Id., pp. 19-20, 779 So.2d at 747 . Because such provisions were found to be remedial in nature, we concluded that application of the sex offender registration and notification laws to persons convicted before their enactment does not violate ex post facto principles. Id. Similarly, in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2002 [2003]), the United States Supreme Court determined that Alaska’s lifetime registration and notification requirements for sex offenders were non-punitive and, thus, did not violate the ex post facto clause. ⅜ ⅝ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜ After reviewing the foregoing jurisprudence, we find the increase in the number of years Mr. Smith is required to spend as a registered sex offender is not punishment. Accordingly, applying to Mr. Smith the 1999 amendment to former La.Rev.Stat. 15:542.1 does not violate the ex post facto clause. Similarly, the amendments and provisions added in 2”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Lodge · 116 So. 3d 851 - State v. Lodge

2. “|4We next find the court of appeal erred in holding that Mr. Smith could not be required to register for life absent a contradictory hearing. As noted above, under present law the provisions requiring registration for the lifetime of the offender are La.Rev.Stat. 15:544(B)(2)(c) and (E). Based on the plain language of La.Rev.Stat. 15:544, we find Mr. Smith, as a person twice convicted of a qualifying sex offense, did not have the right to a contradictory hearing before the court could impose upon him a lifetime registration obligation. After reviewing the relevant provisions of the sex offender law, we conclude the court of appeal was correct in finding that, before an offender’s obligation can be extended for life, Subsection (E) of La.Rev.Stat. 15:544 requires a contradictory hearing and proof that the offender poses a substantial risk of committing another offense requiring registration. However, that is not the case before us. Mr. Smith was not entitled to a contradictory hearing because his obligation to register for life did not arise under La.Rev.Stat. 15:544(E). Instead, he was subject to lifetime registration as provided by former La.Rev. Stat. 15:542.1(H)(3)(a), now found in La. Rev.Stat. 15:544(B)(2)(c). Under La. Rev.Stat. 15:544(E), an offender can be required by the court to register for life, despite the fact that he was initially required only to register for fifteen or twenty-five years as provided in La.Rev. Stat. 15:544(A) and (B)(1). But that time period c”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 101 So. 3d 623 - State v. Marinoni

3. “The starting point in the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Cats’ Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 98-0601, p. 15 (La.10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1198 ; Touchard v. Williams, 617 So.2d 885 (La.1993). Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will, and therefore, the interpretation of a law involves primarily the search for the legislature’s intent. La. Civ.Code art. 2; Barbara Landry v. Louisiana Citizens Property Ins. Co., 07-1907, p. 20 (La.05/21/08), 983 So.2d 66, 79 ; Detillier v. Kenner Regional Med. Ctr., 03-3259, p. 3 (La.7/6/04), 877 So.2d 100, 103 . La. Civ. Code art. 9 provides that, when a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. When the words of a law are ambiguous, their meaning must be sought by examining the context in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole, and laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other. La. Rev.Stat. 1:3; La. Civ.Code arts. 12 and 13; Conerly v. State, 97-0871, p. 4 (La.7/8/98), 714 So.2d 709, 711 . Where two statutes deal with the same subject matter, they should be harmonized if possible. La. Civ.Code art. 13; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 96-0741, p. 2 (La.11/25/96), 699 So.2d 351, 358 (on rehearing).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 89 So. 3d 411 - State v. Nye