Sohn v. Waterson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

70 federal appellate · 19 district · 82 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 251 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““A statute of limitations may undoubtedly have effect upon actions which have already accrued as well as upon actions which accrue after its passage. Whether it does so or not will depend upon the language of the act, and the apparent intent of the legislature to be gathered therefrom. When a statute declares generally that no action, or no action of a certain class shall be brought, except within a certain limited time after it shall have accrued, the language of the statute would make it apply to past actions as well as to those arising in the future. But if an action accrued more than the limited time before the statute was passed a literal interpretation of the statute would have the effect of absolutely barring such action at once. It will be presumed that such was not the intent of the legislature. Such an intent would be unconstitutional. To avoid such a result, and to give the statute a construction that will enable it to stand, courts have given it a prospective operation. In doing this, three different modes have been adopted by different courts. One is to make the statute apply only to causes of action arising after its passage. But as this construction leaves all actions existing at the passage of the act, without any limitation at all (which, it is presumed, could not have been intended), another rule adopted is, to construe the statute as applying to such 'existing actions only as have already run out a portion of the statutory time, but which still have a reaso”

   13 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Fullerton-Krueger Lumber Co. v. Northern Pacific Railway Co. · Block v. North Dakota Board of University and School Lands North Dakota Board of University and School Lands

2. ““Previous to the act of 1827 there was no law of the state of Illinois which limited, the time within which an action of covenant shall be brought, and, consequently, there was no restriction as to the period within which a suit might be instituted upon the cause of action now in question. * * * And as the plaintiff did not come into the state there was no limitation running against it until the passage of the act of 1837. This act, by repealing the saving contained in tile former law, brought the claim within its provisions, and subjected it to the limitations therein contained. The question is, from what time is this limitation to be calculated? Upon principle, it would seem to be clear that it must commence when the cause of action is first subjected to the operation of the statute, unless the Legislature has otherwise provided. For it is at that time that the statute first acts upon it and limits,, the period within which suit must be brought. Such is obviously the policy and intention of the Illinois statute of limitations. For if the plaintiff had come into the state the day before the act of 1837 was passed, and by that means subjected his cause of action to the provisions of the former law, the limitation would have commenced on that day, and his action would not have been barred until the expiration of 16 years afterwards.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Wehrli · International Fashions v. Buchanan

3. ““In construing a statute of limitations it must, so far as it affects rights of action in existence when the statute is passed, be held, in the absence of contrary provisions, to begin when the cause of action is first subjected to its operation. Hence, when a right of action accrued in 1854, and a statute of limitations passed in 1859 barred all actions of its hind not ‘commenced within two years next after the cause or right of such action shall have accrued,’ held that the cause of action began to run from the date of the statute, and that suit might have been brought any time within two years from that date, and accordingly that the statute had not summarily cut off existing rights.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Wehrli