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840 So. 2d 356

Singleton v. Greymar Associates

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 2003-03-05

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently November 2016

7 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[e]ven though an earlier foreclosure action filed by [the lender] was dismissed with prejudice, the application of res judicata does not bar this lawsuit.... The second action involved a new and different breach.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 241 N.C. App. 247 - In re Rogers Townsend & Thomas, PC, 882 So. 2d 1004 - Singleton v. Greymar Associates

“`[A] final adjudication in a foreclosure action that also prays for a deficiency judgment on the underlying debt may, but does not necessarily, bar a subsequent action on the debt.'”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 882 So. 2d 1004 - Singleton v. Greymar Associates

Relies on 791 So. 2d 1093 - Andrews v. Florida Parole Commission · Hampton Enterprises, Inc. v. Adelman · 774 So. 2d 863 - Olympia Mortgage Corp. v. Pugh

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2003-03-05

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

PER CURIAM.

¶1We affirm the summary final judgment of foreclosure. Even though an earlier foreclosure action filed by appellee was dismissed with prejudice, the application of res judicata does not bar this lawsuit. The first foreclosure action sought relief due to appellants’ failure to make payments from September 1, 1999 onward, with interest accruing from August 1, 1999 through February 1, 2000; this foreclosure action was based on appellants’ failure to make payments from April 1, 2000 onward, with interest accruing from March 1, 2000 through July 1, 2001. The second action involved a new and different breach.

¶2In Capital Bank v. Needle, 596 So.2d 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), we wrote:

Our reading of the case law ... leads us to conclude that a final adjudication in a foreclosure action that also prays for a deficiency judgment on the underlying debt may, but does not necessarily, bar a subsequent action on the debt. For instance, if the plaintiff in a foreclosure action goes to trial and loses on the merits, we do not believe such plaintiff would be barred from filing a subsequent foreclosure action based upon a subsequent default. The adjudication merely bars a second action relitigating the same alleged default.

¶3Id. at 1138 (emphasis in original); see also Olympia Mortgage Corp. v. Pugh, 774 So.2d 863 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), review denied, 791 So.2d 1100 (Fla.2001).

¶4AFFIRMED.

STEVENSON, GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur.
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