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← 842 P.2d 220 - State v. Moldovan

State v. Moldovan’s Empirical Analysis

1992

Citation profile

52
cited by 52 later decisions
2
states following
February 2022
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 49 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 52 later decisions — most recently February 2022 · most notably Bertrand v. Board of County Commissioners of Park County (1994), Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness (1997)

2 federal appellate · 1 district · 49 state decisions

2801992200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Evans v. Board of County Commissioners · Leake v. Cain · Woodsmall v. Regional Transportation District · Colorado Common Cause v. Meyer · Bloomer v. Board of County Commissioners

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"Dangerous condition” means a physical condition of a facility or the use thereof which constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, which is known to exist or which in the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to exist and which condition is proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity in constructing or maintaining such facility. For the purpose of this subsection (1), a dangerous condition should have been known to exist if it is established that the condition had existed for such a period of time and was of such a nature that, in the exercise of reasonable care, such condition and its dangerous character should have been discovered.”
    8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “meant primarily to delete traffic signs, signals, or markings, or the lack thereof from the statutory definition of the phrase "physically interferes with the movement of traffic" and that it would be specious to hold that a foreseeable condition, whether it exists on or off the road surface, that has and will continue to present a dangerous condition may exist if there has been a failure to maintain the roadside so as to avoid the presence of obstructions.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[a] dangerous condition of a public highway, road, or street which physically interferes with the movement of traffic ....”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.