Daniel v. Daniel’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 1 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “satisfy the heavy burden established in McLendon. " The mother appeals from the trial court's June 6, 2003, judgment. She contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the parties' divorce judgment preferred the father as a custodian and in applying the McLendon standard to her petition based upon that conclusion; she further contends that the trial court should have modified the custody provisions of the divorce judgment even if the McLendon standard was applicable to her petition. The father contends that the trial court properly applied the McLendon standard and properly denied the mother's petition. Although a trial court's judgment that is based on that court's findings of fact in a child-custody-modification case will not be reversed absent a showing that the findings are plainly and palpably wrong, the ore tenus rule has no application to the mother's contention regarding the inapplicability of the McLendon standard because the question raised "is not based on a finding of fact; rather it is one of law — whether the correct burden of proof was imposed by the trial court.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 885 So. 2d 791 - Rehfeld v. Roth

2. “"Where the parties agree to joint legal custody and shared physical custody of the children without a judicial determination preferring either parent, `custody [is] appropriately determined by the trial court according to what [is] in the "best interest" of the children.' Ex parte Couch , 521 So.2d 987 , 989 (Ala. 1988). However, where the parents have joint legal custody, but a previous judicial determination grants primary custody to one parent and secondary custody to the other, `the trial court [is] correct in applying the McLendon standard and requiring the [parent] to show that a change in custody would materially promote the welfare and best interests of the child, offsetting the disruptive effect of uprooting the child.' Blackmon v. Scott , 622 So.2d 393 , 394 (Ala.Civ.App. 1993)."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 885 So. 2d 791 - Rehfeld v. Roth

3. “of the children.' Ex parte Couch , 521 So.2d 987 , 989 (Ala. 1988). However, where the parents have joint legal custody, but a previous judicial determination grants primary custody to one parent and secondary custody to the other, `the trial court [is] correct in applying the McLendon standard and requiring the [parent] to show that a change in custody would materially promote the welfare and best interests of the child, offsetting the disruptive effect of uprooting the child.' Blackmon v. Scott , 622 So.2d 393 , 394 (Ala.Civ.App. 1993).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 885 So. 2d 791 - Rehfeld v. Roth