¶1TRANSFER ORDER
¶2Before the Panel:
¶4Defendants
¶5Wright sets out a number of reasons for opposing centralization. First, it says that the multiple intervening causation issues— such as a given plaintiffs health, medical issues and lifestyle—are prominent in all actions. Therefore, Wright asserts, the actions are actually dissimilar. However, almost all injury litigation involves questions of causation that are case- and plaintiff-specific. Such differences have not been an impediment to centralization in the past. See, e.g., In re Zimmer Durom Hip Cup Prods. Liab. Litig., 717 F.Supp.2d 1376, 1378 (J.P.M.L.2010).
¶6For all these reasons, on the basis of the papers filed and the hearing session held, we find that these actions involve common questions of fact, and that centralization will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation. The actions share factual questions concerning design, manufacture, marketing and performance of Wright’s Conserve line of hip implant products. Centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings on discovery and other issues, and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary.
¶7II.
¶8A few other matters on individual cases require our attention.
¶9Plaintiffs in the Northern District of California Tucker action oppose centralization of their action on the grounds that plaintiff did not receive a Conserve device. *1373Wright agrees, as does moving plaintiff, who acknowledges having mistakenly included Tucker on the motion for centralization. Given the agreement of the parties, we decline to centralize this unrelated action.
¶10Relatedly, it is unclear whether plaintiff in the District of Arizona Welch action includes allegations regarding a Conserve device or whether the action is exclusively focused on non-Conserve components of her hip implant. Given the possibility that plaintiff in Welch is making some claims regarding a Conserve hip implant, we are unwilling, based on the record before us, to conclude that Welch warrants exclusion from the centralized proceedings. Instead, we encourage the transferee judge to scrutinize whether plaintiff alleges defects associated with a Conserve device. If the transferee judge discovers that a Conserve hip implant is, in fact, not at issue in Welch (or any other transferred action), then we encourage him to promptly suggest that the Panel remand such action to the transferor court. See Rule 10.1(b), R.P.J.P.M.L.; In re ClassicStar Mare Lease Litig., 528 F.Supp.2d 1345, 1347 (J.P.M.L.2007).
¶11The concerns of plaintiffs in three potential tag-along actions that centralization may slow the progress of their respective action are best addressed by opposing the conditional transfer order covering the actions, if issued, or by presenting such arguments to the transferee judge.
¶12III.
¶13Finally, we conclude that the Northern District of Georgia is an appropriate transferee district for centralized pretrial proceedings in this litigation. These cases involve medical devices that are marketed and sold throughout the nation. Wright is based in Arlington, Tennessee, and most parties agree that N.D. Georgia would be an appropriate transferee forum. The district is geographically central, accessible, and enjoys favorable docket conditions. Further, Judge William S. Duffey, Jr., is an experienced transferee judge who we are confident will steer this litigation on a prudent course.
¶14IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, the actions listed on Schedule A are transferred to the Northern District of Georgia and, with the consent of that court, assigned to the Honorable William S. Duffey, Jr., for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.
¶15IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that transfer of the action listed on Schedule B is denied.
¶16SCHEDULE A
¶17MDL No. 2329 — IN RE: WRIGHT MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, INC., CONSERVE HIP IMPLANT PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
¶18District of Arizona
¶19Virginia M. Welch v. Wright Medical Technology Inc., et al, C.A. No. 2:11— 002113
¶20Central District of California
¶21Carole Ream v. Wright Medical Group, Inc., et al, C.A. No. 5:11-01652
¶22Southern District of Georgia
¶23Danny L. James, Sr. v. Wright Medical Technology, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 2:11— 00200
¶24District of Utah
¶25Eric B. Snitkojf v. Wright Medical Technology, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 2:11-00390
¶27Northern District of California
¶28Gregory K. Tucker, et al. v. Wright Medical Technology, Inc., et al, C.A. No. 4:11-03086
¶29 Judges W. Royal Furgeson, Jr., and Marjorie O. Rendell did not participate in the decision of this matter.
¶30. Conserve Femoral Surface Replacement; Conserve Plus Total Resurfacing Hip System; Conserve Total A-Class Advanced Metal; and Conserve Total Hip System.
¶31. These actions and any other related actions are potential tag-along actions. See Rules 1.1(h), 7.1 and 7.2, R.P.J.P.M.L.
¶32. Wright Medical Group, Inc., and Wright Medical Technology, Inc. (collectively Wright).
¶33. "In opposing centralization, Zimmer argues, inter alia, that the actions involve multiple individualized fact issues (for example, with respect to causation), and that creation of an MDL might derail its ongoing efforts to settle claims involving the Durom Cup quickly and without the expenditure of substantial time and resources. We understand these arguments, but our experience causes us to respectfully disagree as to their significance. Though the actions certainly present some individual issues, this is usually true of device cases and other products liability cases.”