GONZALEZ, LLC v. DiVincenti’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 1 district · 23 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"`The standard of review applicable to a summary judgment is the same as the standard for granting the motion, that is, we must determine whether there was a genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether the movant was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Our review is further subject to the caveat that this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Wilson v. Brown , 496 So.2d 756 , 758 (Ala. 1986); Harrell v. Reynolds Metals Co. , 495 So.2d 1381 (Ala. 1986). See also Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc. , 564 So.2d 412 (Ala. 1990).'"”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 878 So. 2d 1138 - Stiff v. ALABAMA ALCOHOLIC BEV. CONTROL BD. · 890 So. 2d 70 - Alabama Alcohol. Bev. Bd. v. Henri-Duval Winery

2. “"In the present case the motions for attorney fees were pending at the time that the trial court issued its orders of June 16, 1993. This court would note that neither of these orders contained a ruling on the pending motions for attorney fees and that the trial court failed to retain jurisdiction to consider the motions at a later date.... "While Donnell's argument that it did everything that it could to have the matter heard can be appreciated, it is not persuasive. Since the [Alabama Litigation Accountability] Act provides that the trial court shall award the attorney fees as a part of its judgment, it was incumbent upon Donnell to have the trial court either rule on the pending motion for attorney fees when it granted its motion for summary judgment or reserve jurisdiction to hear the motion for attorney fees at a later date. "In light of the above, we cannot say that, under the facts of this case, the trial court retained jurisdiction to hold a separate hearing on the motion for attorney fees after the entry of a final judgment. Consequently, we find that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the motion for attorney fees."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Langham v. Wampol

3. “Judgments can bind persons not party (or privy) to the litigation in question where the nonparties' interests were represented adequately by a party in the original suit. A person may be bound by a judgment even though not a party to a suit if one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be his virtual representative. Moreover, if a party has a sufficient laboring oar in the conduct of the litigation, then the principle of res judicata can be actuated.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sophocleus v. Alabama Department of Transportation