Sizemore v. Commonwealth’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"In Shannon , we recognized that an individual may intentionally commit murder while acting under a wanton or reckless belief, and that the actor's subjective belief may be unreasonable when viewed by an objective standard. Shannon, supra at 550-51 . . . . If the jury believes from the evidence that the defendant's claimed need for self-defense is objectively reasonable under the circumstances, then it becomes a complete defense. However, if the justification is not reasonable, then the defendant can only be convicted under Shannon of either the offenses of manslaughter in the second degree or reckless homicide, depending upon the jury's determination of the defendant's state of mind at the time of the act. Shannon, supra at 552 . . . . [T]he gist of the reasoning is that `[a] subjective belief in the need for self-defense, which is objectively wanton or reckless, is a `circumstance' falling within the definition of wanton or reckless behavior, punishable under Manslaughter II or Reckless Homicide. . . .' Id. at 551-52 ."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. McGinnis v. Commonwealth

2. “"[W]antonness suffices to establish culpability for manslaughter in the second degree, but it does not suffice to establish culpability for wanton murder, which requires the additional state-of-mind element of manifest extreme indifference to human life [`the actor's conscious disregard of the risk']." [Emphasis original.] Citing Model Penal Code § 210.2, comment, p. 21 (Am.Law Inst.1980). . . . . As the statutes reveal, the General Assembly intends that a defendant who has used deadly force in the [subjective, erroneous] belief that such force was necessary to protect himself against death or serious physical injury is not guilty of wanton murder. The rationale for this legislative decision is similarly plain: where the actor believes in the need to protect his life, the circumstances, while they may demonstrate wantonness, cannot manifest extreme indifference to human life." 844 S.W.2d at 403 . (Emphasis original.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. McGinnis v. Commonwealth

3. “[W]antonness suffices to establish culpability for manslaughter in the second degree, but it does not suffice to establish culpability for wanton murder, which requires the additional state-of-mind element of manifest extreme indifference to human life [`the actor's conscious disregard of the risk'].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. McGinnis v. Commonwealth