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← 845 F.2d 471 - Hooper v. Da Garraghty

Hooper v. Da Garraghty’s Empirical Analysis

845 F.2d 471 · 1988

Citation profile

52
cited by 52 later decisions
6
states following
February 2023
most recently cited

16 federal appellate · 2 district · 9 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 52 later decisions — most recently February 2023 · most notably Fields v. Attorney General of Maryland (1992), 874 So. 2d 1176 - Grosvenor v. State (2004)

16 federal appellate · 2 district · 9 state decisions

18019881990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Hill v. Lockhart · McMann v. Richardson · Ake v. Oklahoma · Kimmelman v. Morrison

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[W]e do not put great weight in Hooper's representation that ... he would have chosen to go to trial. Although it carries some probative value, such a statement suffers from obvious credibility problems and must be evaluated in light of the circumstances the defendant would have faced at the time of his decision.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[a]lthough [the prejudice prong of the Hill test] focuses the inquiry on a subjective question [that is, whether the defendant would not have pleaded guilty], the answer to that question must be reached through an objective analysis.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Even if Hooper had had a psychiatric report similar to the one produced in 1986, his only rational conclusion would have been that he faced serious obstacles in attempting to pursue an insanity defense. By accepting the plea agreement, Hooper was able to have the principal charge against him reduced to second degree murder.... Examining the 1986 psychiatric report against the background of the circumstances Hooper faced at the time he decided to plead guilty, we are not persuaded that it is sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable probability that had Hooper's lawyers obtained a sanity evaluation in 1979, Hooper would have declined the plea bargain in favor of a jury trial.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.