845 So. 2d 142 - Wilson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

90 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 92 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Judicial participation in plea negotiations followed by a harsher sentence is one of the circumstances that, along with other factors, should be considered in determining whether there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the harsher sentence was imposed in retaliation for the defendant not pleading guilty and instead exercising his or her right to proceed to trial. (Citation omitted). The other factors that should be considered include but are not limited to: (1) whether the trial judge initiated the plea discussions with the defendant in violation of Warner ; (2) whether the trial judge, through his or her comments on the record, appears to have departed from his or her role as an impartial arbiter by either urging the defendant to accept a plea, or by implying or stating that the sentence imposed would hinge on future procedural choices, such as exercising the right to trial; (3) the disparity between the plea offer and the ultimate sentence imposed; and (4) the lack of any facts on the record that explain the reason for the increased sentence other than that the defendant exercised his or her right to a trial or hearing.”

   32 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Richard Walker v. State of Florida · Hallmon v. State

2. “As regards factors (1) and (2), if the judge participates in the plea negotiations beyond what is contemplated by Warner, or by his or her comments appears to have departed from the role of a neutral arbiter, then these actions alone may give rise to a presumption of judicial vindictiveness that would shift the burden to the State to produce affirmative evidence on the record to dispel the presumption.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Zeigler v. State · Baxter v. State

3. “I do not believe that Warner forbids a judge from becoming involved in a discussion wherein the accused is asked whether he is aware of the state's pending plea offer and his or her maximum exposure if convicted at trial. Indeed, I understand why trial judges go out of their way to determine whether criminal defendants have been advised of any and all plea offers prior to trial. A recurring post-conviction claim is that trial counsel was ineffective in that he or she failed to communicate a plea offer made by the state or failed to advise the defendant of his full exposure if convicted at trial. In order to address this potential problem, many trial judges have adopted the practice of asking the attorneys immediately before trial, in the defendant's presence, whether a plea offer has been extended and whether the same has been communicated to the defendant. In fact, the trial judge in the present case did just that. Immediately after calling the case and allowing counsel for the state and defense to identify themselves, the court asked defense counsel if a plea offer had been made. Defense counsel advised the court of the state's offer and correctly identified his client's maximum exposure if convicted. The judge then asked defendant: "You still don't want the four years?" The defendant responded: "No, no." This discussion, consuming no more than two pages of the transcript, accomplished the goal of establishing a record that the defendant was fully apprised of the plea offer”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 851 So. 2d 222 - Snow v. Crosby