State v. Stevens’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

29 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “When evaluating the validity of a stop, the trial court must consider the “totality of the circumstances.” Factors which may be consistent with innocent conduct when considered alone, may, when taken together, amount to reasonable suspicion. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9-10 , 109 S.Ct. at 1586-87 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 11-12 . “ ‘[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is “innocent” or “guilty,” but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.’ ” Id. at 10 , 109 S.Ct. at 1587 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 12 (quoting [Illinois v.] Gates, 462 U.S. [213] at 243-44 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. at 2359 n. 13, 76 L.Ed.2d at 552 n. 13) [ (1983) ]. Thus, for example, nervousness can be a factor supporting reasonable suspicion, see [Florida v.] Royer, 460 U.S. [491] at 493 n. 2, 502, 103 S.Ct. at 1322 n. 2, 1326-27, 75 L.Ed.2d at 233 n. 2, 239 [ (1983) ], and even probable cause. Burkhardt, 795 S.W.2d at 405 ; State v. Dixon, 809 S.W.2d 116, 118-19 (Mo.App.1991). On the other hand a trial court, having heard the testimony, may assess the extent and significance of defendant’s nervousness and determine that the nervousness described does not give rise to an objective reasonable suspicion. [U.S. v.] Walker, 933 F.2d [812] at 817 [ (10th Cir.1991) ]; State v. Donohoe, 770 S.W.2d 252, 258 (Mo.App.1989); United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1418 (8th Cir.1989); United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1371 (11th Cir.1990).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Day

2. “The officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” The Fourth Amendment requires “some minimal level of objective justification” for making the stop. That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. We have held that probable cause means “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,” and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Kelly

3. “If the detention extends beyond the time reasonable necessary to effect its initial purpose, the seizure may lose its lawful character unless a new factual predicate for reasonable suspicion is found during the period of lawful seizure.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Pfleiderer