Summers v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(a) In this section: (1) “Sexual performance” means any performance or part thereof that includes sexual conduct by a child younger than 17 years of age. (2) “Sexual conduct” means actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals. [[Image here]] (8) “Sado-masochistic abuse” has the meaning defined by Section 43.24 of this code. (b) A person commits an offense, if, knowing the character and content thereof, he employs, authorizes, or induces a child younger than 17 years of age to engage in sexual conduct or a sexual performance. A parent or legal guardian or custodian of a child younger than 17 years of age commits an offense if he consents to the participation by the child in a sexual performance. (c) An offense under Subsection (b) of this section is a felony of the second degree. (d) A person commits an offense if, knowing the character and content of the material, he produces, directs or promotes a performance that includes sexual conduct by a child younger than 17 years of age. (e) An offense under Subsection (d) of this section is a felony of the third degree.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Anderson

2. “Prior to 1985, Section 43.25(b) provided that an offense occurred if a person employed, authorized, or induced a child younger than 17 years of age “to engage in a sexual performance.” In 1985, the legislature amended Section 43.25(b) to read “to engage in sexual conduct or a sexual performance.” The post-amendment language of Section 43.25(b) indicates the legislature’s intent that employing, authorizing, or inducing a child to engage in either sexual conduct or sexual performance is an offense under Section iS. 25(b). We disagree with appellant’s contention that, by adding the words “sexual conduct or” to the statute, the legislature intended to limit the offense to only sexual performance as defined by Section 43.25(a)(1) and not to include sexual conduct as defined by Section 43.25(a)(2). The indictment alleged an offense against the laws of the State of Texas as defined by Section 43.25(b). Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to quash, and appellant’s point of error is overruled.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Anderson