846 So. 2d 502 - Menna v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A]s in Herring , the 'trial court here was entitled to conclude on the facts that -it would be unfair where the police may have led the defendant to believe that [she! had a right-to ¿refuse to allow [the defendant’s] refusal to be used against her because her decision to refuse was “safe harbor.” Although neither [detective] recalled explicitly, telling [the defendant] that the test was either compulsory or optional, [one detective] agreed that the nature of his questioning would have indicated to [the defendant] that she had the option to refuse to take the test..”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jason D. Allen v. State of Florida · Howitt v. State

2. “[A] defendant who is told he may refuse and is told of no consequences which would attach to his refusal may quite plausibly refuse so as to disengage himself from further interaction "with the police or simply decide not to volunteer to do anything he is not compelled to do. In contrast, if a defendant knows that his refusal carries with it adverse consequences, the hypothesis that the refusal was an innocent act is far less plausible. Thus, in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), the Court, holding admissible the defendant’s refusal to take a blood alcohol test, pointed out that, although the defendant was not told that the refusal could be used against him in court, he was told that he could lose his driver’s license if he refused. This latter warning made it “clear that refusing the test was not a ‘safe harbor,’ free of adverse consequences.” Id. at 566 , 103 S.Ct. at 924 , 74 L.Ed.2d at 760 . While the court in Neville held the refusal admissible because the defendant had good reason not to refuse, it noted, in comparison, that in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 , 95 S.Ct. 2133 , 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), the Court had prohibited the impeachment use of the defendant’s post-Mz-rawfe-warning silence because his “silence during police interrogation lacked significant probative value and ... any reference to his silence under such circumstances carried with it an intolerably prejudicial impact.” Id. at 180 , 95 S.Ct. at 2138 , 45 L.E”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jason D. Allen v. State of Florida

3. “The unfairness, of course, is that a defendant who is told he may refuse and is told of no consequences which would attach to his refusal may quite plausibly refuse so as to disengage himself from further interaction with the police or simply decide not to volunteer to do anything he is not compelled to do. In contrast, if a defendant knows that his refusal carries with it adverse consequences, the hypothesis that the refusal was an innocent act is far less plausible.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Howitt v. State