Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

848 F.2d 199

Docket 87-5176

United States v. Jenkins (Antonio)

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued April 28, 1988

Decided May 18, 1988

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently November 1988

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“THIS DISPOSITION IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE CITED TO OR BY THE COURTS OF THIS CIRCUIT EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY 9TH CIR.R. 36-3. That restriction parallels our own Court of Appeals' Circuit Rule 53(b)(2)(iv). Although in literal terms it does not prohibit citation to this Court (because it is not a court in the Ninth Circuit), (1) the unpublished opinion has not been furnished to this Court by State Farm and (2) even if it had, this Court would be wholly disinclined to treat it as citeable authority under the circumstances.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Martin v. Brunzelle

Relies on United States v. Givens · United States v. Browne · In Re Marquam Investment Corporation

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Lavelle Rondell JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 87-5176.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 28, 1988.*
Decided May 20, 1988.

Before FERGUSON, NORRIS and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.

¶1

Lavelle Rondell Johnson appeals his conviction for possession of contraband in prison, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1971(a)(2). Johnson contends that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that evidence of his 1986 armed robbery conviction and his 1978 grand theft conviction could be used to impeach him if he elected to testify.

¶2

Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a defendant's prior conviction is admissible for impeachment purposes if it involves "dishonesty or false statement," or if it is a felony conviction and "the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant."

¶3

Here, the government met its burden of showing that the probative value of the evidence of Johnson's prior felony convictions outweighed their prejudicial effect.

¶4

The district court properly considered the impeachment value of Johnson's prior grand theft and armed robbery convictions, the fact that Johnson's armed robbery conviction occurred less than one year prior to his possession of a knife while in prison, the lack of similarity between the past crimes and the charged offense, and the fact that Johnson's credibility was a central issue in the case. See United States v. Browne, 829 F.2d 760, 762-64 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Givens, 767 F.2d 574, 579-80 (9th Cir.1985).

¶5

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that evidence of Johnson's prior convictions could be used to impeach him if he chose to testify. Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(1), United States v. Browne, 829 F.2d at 760.

¶6

AFFIRMED.

*

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a) and Ninth Circuit Rule 34-4

…

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Circuit Rule 36-3

/848/f2d/199 · .json · Public domain