Miller v. Tassin’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In Fraternal Order of Police v. City of New Orleans, XXXX-XXXX (La.11/8/02), 831 So.2d 897 , the City of New Orleans filed a writ application after the court of appeal's dismissed its appeal because it was purportedly untimely. The decision the City sought to appeal was a partial summary judgment entered by the trial judge pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 966(E) on 27 April 2000. On 5 June 2000, 39 days after the issuance of the judgment, the City filed a motion to certify the partial judgment as final for purposes of immediate appeal, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915. Although the trial judge signed an order certifying the partial judgment as final on 20 June 2000, the notice of signing of the order was not mailed to counsel for the City until 7 November 2000. The City filed its appeal the next day. This court dismissed the appeal as untimely on the basis of the Supreme Court's previous interpretation of the pre-1999 amendment version of La. C.C.P. art. 1915 in Shell Pipeline Corp. v. Kennedy, XXXX-XXXX (La.10/16/01), 799 So.2d 475 . Applying Shell Pipeline, the majority found that the appeal in this case was untimely because it was not filed with 67-days of the signing of judgment. The 67 day period was calculated by adding the seven-day delay for filing a motion for new trial, established by La. C.C.P. art. 1974, to the 60-day delay for filing a devolutive appeal, established by La. C.C.P. art. 2087. The issues presented to the Court were: (1) whether a motion to certify a part”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Roundtree v. New Orleans Aviation Bd.

2. “We expressly disapprove and overrule the procedure of converting the appeal from a non-trial judgment to a supervisory writ and then considering the merits, as was done in Karim v. Finch Shipping Co., Ltd., 97-2518 (La.App. 4 Cir.8/26/98), 718 So.2d 572 , and Walker, Bordelon, Hamlin, Theriot and Hardy, etc. v. Dowe, supra, 98-0937, 98-0938 (La.App. 4 Cir.12/9/98), 727 So.2d 529 . We agree with our colleagues of the First Circuit that To entertain by a supervisory writ application and grant a stay of a judgment which is not a final judgment subject to an immediate appeal under Article 1915 would be a blatant circumvention of the spirit of that statute, causing the delay and judicial inefficiency which the statute obviously is designed to eliminate. To substitute one method of review (writ application) for a prohibited method of review (appeal) flies in the face of the legislative pronouncement set forth in Article 1915. Therefore, we will not entertain the merits of this writ application. Review of the judgment must await rendition of a complete final judgment in the case, which will be the proper subject of an appeal, unless the judgment is certified as a final judgment subject to an immediate appeal under Article 1915. In re: Chemical Release at Bogalusa, 98-1122 at p. 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.8/27/98), 718 So.2d 1015 . While we adopt this reasoning, we decline to certify a partial summary judgment as a final judgment subject to an immediate appeal on the appellate level, as our co”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Roundtree v. New Orleans Aviation Bd.

3. “A. A final judgment may be rendered and signed by the court, even though it may not grant the successful party or parties all of the relief prayed for, or may not adjudicate all of the issues in the case, when the court: (1) Dismisses the suit as to less than all of the parties, defendants, third party plaintiffs, third party defendants, or intervenors. * * :¡: * (3) Grants a motion for summary judgment, as provided by Articles 966 through 969, but not including a summary judgment granted pursuant to Article 966(E). * * * * B. (1) When a court renders a partial judgment or partial summary judgment or sustains an exception in part, as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories, whether in an original demand, recon-ventional demand, cross-claim, third party claim, or intervention, the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as a final judgment by the court after an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. [Emphasis added.] [[Image here]]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 945 So. 2d 136 - Ricks v. Butler