85 Md. App. 28 - Kline v. Kline’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

38 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The court, when it grants a divorce, cannot return to the grantor spouse the legal interest that he or she had earlier given just because the gift was of nonmarital property; to do so would violate § 8—202(a)(3) of the Act, which expressly prohibits the divorce court from transferring ownership of property, real or personal, from one spouse to the other. Watson [v. Watson], 77 Md.App. [622] at 631, 632, 551 A.2d 505 [ (1989) ]. See also Rogers v. Rogers, 80 Md.App. 575, 586 , 565 A.2d 361 (1989); Nisos v. Nisos, 60 Md.App. 368, 380-381 , 483 A.2d 97 (1984).””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 97 Md. App. 347 - Choate v. Choate · 100 Md. App. 429 - Jandorf v. Jandorf

2. ““Marital debt,” like “marital property” and “nonmarital property,” is a term that seems to invite confusion. “Debt,” like “property,” is a word quite familiar to almost everyone who can read, speak, or understand English. The most familiar connotations of “marital debt,” however, are (1) a debt incurred by husband and wife jointly or (2) a debt incurred by either spouse for any marital purpose. Within the purview of the Act, however, the phrase has an artificial meaning at variance with these familiar connotations. A marital debt is a debt incurred to acquire marital property, (citations omitted). As with “marital property” or “nonmarital property,” this concept arises only as an incident of marriage and is significant only if and when there is a judicial dissolution of the marital relationship. The sole purpose of applying the concept of “marital debt” is to diminish the value of marital property, on the theory that to the extent it is encumbered by debt marital property has not been acquired within the contemplation of the Act. (Citations omitted.) Who owes the debt is as immaterial as who owns the property. And the debt need not be a lien or encumbrance on the property; it is sufficient that there is a debt outstanding and that it was incurred to acquire the property. Finally, marital debt cannot be transferred from one item of marital property to another.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 86 Md. App. 581 - Coutant v. Coutant

3. ““In Grant , the Court of Appeals held that the presumption of gift that arises from the conveyance of one spouse to another has no applicability to the determination of whether property is marital or nonmarital. Dorsey v. Dorsey, 302 Md. 312 , 487 A.2d 1181 (1985), recognized the possibility of proving a gift of the marital status of property as well as the property itself. In Watson [v. Watson, 77 Md.App. 622 , 551 A.2d 505 (1989) ], however, we explained that a gift of property, whether proved by presumption, by testimony as to expression of intent, or by documents conclusively establishing donative intent, does not transmute the status of that property, for purposes of the Act, from nonmarital to marital. To effect such transmutation, we pointed out, there must be an express intent to give up, waive, or surrender the nonmarital status as well as to give the property itself.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 97 Md. App. 347 - Choate v. Choate