White v. Yup’s Empirical Analysis
1969
Citation profile
63 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 64 later decisions — most recently March 2018 · most notably Summerfield v. Superior Court, Maricopa Cty. (1985), Humes v. Clinton (1990)
63 state decisions — followed in 20 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Woods v. Lancet · Smith v. Brennan · Verkennes v. Corniea · 91 Ga. App. 712 - Porter v. Lassiter · State Ex Rel. Odham v. Sherman
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 64 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“A. If a child, injured when a viable fetus as a result of another’s negligence, has a cause of action when born, then it can make no difference in liability whether death occurs just prior to or just after birth. B. A viable unborn child is, in fact, biologically speaking, a presently existing person and a living human being, because it has reached such a state of development that it can presently live outside the female body, as well as within it. C. If no right of action is allowed, there is a wrong inflicted for which there is no remedy. Where negligent acts produce a stillbirth and a right of action is denied, an incongruous result is produced. For example, if a doctor acted negligently while delivering a baby and it died, the doctor would be immune from lawsuit. However, if he badly injured the child, the doctor would be exposed to liability. Under such a rule, there is the absurd result that the greater the harm, the better the chance of im munity, and the tort-feasor could foreclose his own liability. (Citations omitted in each instance.)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Any liability imposed upon a wife, husband, son, daughter, father, mother, brother, sister or other immediate member of a family arising out of his or her driving and operating a motor vehicle upon a highway with the permission, express or implied, of such owner is hereby imposed upon the owner of the motor vehicle, and such owner shall be jointly and severally liable with his or her wife, husband, son, daughter, father, mother, brother, sister or other immediate member of a family for any damages proximately resulting from such negligence or willful misconduct, and such negligent or willful misconduct shall be imputed to the owner of the motor vehicle for all purposes of civil damages.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Arata v. Faubion“The origin, use, and standard definitions of the family purpose doctrine provide ample evidence that the rule is primarily a plaintiff’s device. We reject any attempt to use the doctrine as a defense technique to impute a family member’s contributory negligence to the family car owner or a member of the family who as plaintiff is seeking to recover personal or property damages arising when a defendant’s automobile collides with a plaintiffs family purpose car. 458 P.2d at 619 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.