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← 850 F.2d 1402 - Bundy v. Dugger

Bundy v. Dugger’s Empirical Analysis

850 F.2d 1402 · 1988

Citation profile

79
cited by 79 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
10
states following
May 2025
most recently cited

28 federal appellate · 2 district · 13 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 79 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2025 · most notably 577 So. 2d 474 - Kuenzel v. State (1990), Spaziano v. Singletary (1994)

28 federal appellate · 2 district · 13 state decisions — followed in 10 states

56019881990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Blockburger v. United States · Faretta v. California · Younger v. Harris · Wainwright v. Sykes

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 79 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “From our predecessor circuit we have inherited two somewhat inconsistent lines of authority with respect to the standard of review we should apply to the district court’s finding that Bundy was competent to stand trial. Under one line of cases a district court’s finding of competency to stand trial is a finding of fact that can be set aside only if clearly erroneous or arbitrary. See United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811 , 822 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 , 100 S.Ct. 93 , 62 L.Ed.2d 60 (1979); United States v. Fratus, 530 F.2d 644 , 647 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 846 , 97 S.Ct. 130 , 50 L.Ed.2d 118 (1976); United States v. Stone, 472 F.2d 909 , 913 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1020 , 101 S.Ct. 586 , 66 L.Ed.2d 482 (1980); United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316 , 317 (5th Cir.1970); see also United States v. Birdsell, 775 F.2d 645 , 648 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1119 , 106 S.Ct. 1979 , 90 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). This is consistent with the approach taken by other circuits. See, e.g., McFadden v. United States, 814 F.2d 144 , 146 (3d Cir.1987); United States v. Lovelace, 683 F.2d 248 , 251 (7th Cir.1982); Chavez v. United States, 656 F.2d 512 , 517 (9th Cir.1981); United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333 , 1349 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 , 96 S.Ct. 877 , 47 L.Ed.2d 97 (1976) (all using the clearly erroneous standard). In another line of cases, however, the Fifth Circuit has been less deferential, reviewing historical facts under”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “[P]rejudice is not presumed simply because the defendant's criminal record is well publicized.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““Jury prejudice can be presumed from pretrial publicity if that publicity is sufficiently prejudicial and inflammatory and if it saturated the community where the trial was held_ This principle is rarely applicable and reserved for extreme situations where pretrial publicity renders ‘virtually impossible a fair trial by an impartial jury drawn from the community.’ ””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.