Nettles v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(9)(a)1. "Prison releasee reoffender" means any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit: . . . . o. Any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual; . . . . within 3 years of being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor. 2. If the state attorney determines that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in subparagraph 1., the state attorney may seek to have the court sentence the defendant as a prison releasee reoffender. Upon proof from the state attorney that establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in this section, such defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced as follows: a. For a felony punishable by life, by a term of imprisonment for life; b. For a felony of the first degree, by a term of imprisonment of 30 years; c. For a felony of the second degree, by a term of imprisonment of 15 years; and d. For a felony of the third degree, by a term of imprisonment of 5 years. (b) A person sentenced under paragraph (a) shall be released only by expiration of sentence and shall not be eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early release. Any person sentenced under paragraph (a) must serve 100 percent of the court-imposed sentence. (c) Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of i”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 957 So. 2d 625 - Reeves v. State · 874 So. 2d 683 - Parker v. State

2. “[I]f we were to follow the logic of the dissent and hold that Nettles could only be sentenced to the 60 months provided by the PRRPA, the result would be a sentence less than that which he would have received, namely 66.4 months, had he not been sentenced as a prison releasee reoffender. Such an interpretation and application would completely ignore the intent of the Legislature in enacting the PRRPA. The Legislature unquestionably intended that those sentenced under the PRRPA would "be punished to the fullest extent of the law." § 775.082(9)(d)1., Fla. Stat. (2000). We have repeatedly held that "`[w]hen construing a statutory provision, legislative intent is the polestar that guides' the Court's inquiry. Legislative intent is determined primarily from the language of a statute." State v. Rife, 789 So.2d 288, 292 (Fla.2001) (quoting McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998)). As Nettles does not contest that he qualifies for sentencing as a prison releasee reoffender, his negotiated sentence of 66.4 months, with the first 60 months being served pursuant to the PRRPA and the remaining 6.4 months served under the CPC, effectuates the Legislature's intent in this case and comports with the applicable statutory provisions. . . . Clearly, we have determined that the sentence provided by the PRRPA is not a mandatory sentence which must be imposed upon an eligible defendant. Rather it is a sentencing "floor," which a judge may exceed if authorized by another provision of ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 957 So. 2d 625 - Reeves v. State

3. “In Jones v. State, 813 So.2d 22 (Fla.2002), we recognized that the establishment of the Criminal Punishment Code in 1998 made substantial changes relating to the sentencing guidelines. See id. at 25 . Under the former sentencing guidelines, a narrow range of permissible sentences was determined through a strict mathematical formula. See § 921.0014(2), Fla. Stat. (2000). It was then within the judge's discretion to sentence the defendant within that narrow range. In contrast, under the now-applicable CPC, "[t]he permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence [as determined by the number of total sentencing points] up to and including the statutory maximum." § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2000). Conceptually, the CPC and the former sentencing guidelines are not synonymous, ...."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 882 So. 2d 977 - Moore v. State