Muniz v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

280 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 286 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual; • (2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to; human life that causes the death of art individual; or (3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Jimenez v. State · Johnson v. State

2. “(a) Any peace officer may arrest, without warrant: (1) persons found in suspicious places and under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some felony or breach of the peace, or threaten, or are about to commit some offense against the laws....”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Dyar v. State · Banda v. State

3. “To establish a waiver, the State must demonstrate that the accused intentionally relinquished a right of which he was aware [citation omitted]. Whether a waiver is shown “must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused [citation omitted].” If the State’s evidence shows nothing more than that the accused responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation, a valid waiver is not shown. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 , 105 S.Ct. 490, 494 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). In Smith , the Supreme Court held that the State may not rely upon an accused’s subsequent responses to police interrogation in order to cast doubt upon the adequacy of the accused’s initial request for counsel. Id. at 100 , 105 S.Ct. at 495 . The Court expressly refused to decide, however, “the circumstances in which an accused’s request for counsel may be characterized as ambiguous or equivocal as a result of events preceding the request or of nuances inherent in the request itself, nor ... the consequences of such ambiguity.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Brownlee v. State