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← 852 F.2d 19 - United States v. Colombo

United States v. Colombo’s Empirical Analysis

852 F.2d 19 · 1988

Citation profile

53
cited by 53 later decisions
9
states following
January 2023
most recently cited

29 federal appellate · 7 district · 13 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 53 later decisions — most recently January 2023 · most notably United States v. Mala (1993), United States v. Casas (2005)

29 federal appellate · 7 district · 13 state decisions

18019881990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (§ 101 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974)

Relies on Barker v. Wingo · United States v. Marion · United States v. MacDonald · United States v. Testan · Rich v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 53 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The courts have implicitly assumed that if an indictment is dismissed on motion of a defendant, and the defendant is subsequently reindicted for the same offense, only the delay in prosecution of the second indictment is relevant for Sixth Amendment speedy trial purposes. Not only is this consistent with the judgment embodied in the Speedy Trial Act, but it makes sense. Once a defendant manages to have all charges against him dismissed, the government must, against its will, re-commence the prosecution from square one, a time consuming process. The defendant’s efforts, therefore, are the main reason for the delay. When the government voluntarily dismisses the charges, however, a different consideration comes into play. Again, the Speedy Trial Act recognizes this, and excludes only the time between indictments, and not the time during the pendency of the first indictment. This is a sound approach, and is equally applicable in Sixth Amendment analysis. Were it otherwise, the government would be able to nullify a defendant’s speedy trial right by the simple expedient of dismissing and reindicting whenever speedy trial time was running out on its prosecution.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “the most serious is [protection against impairment of the defense] because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.