¶1dissenting.
¶2I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Alan Raber on Charles Hellums’s complaint for negligence. In particular, I do not believe that Indiana should adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 876 insofar as such restatement, at least in this case, would negate the need for the plaintiff to establish one of the bedrock elements of negligence, i.e., proximate causation.
¶3As the majority aptly notes, to effectively assert a claim for negligence, Heliums must establish that: (1) Alan had a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances; (2) Alan breached that duty; and (3) Heliums incurred damages as a proximate result of Alan’s breach of duty. See Building Materials Mfg. Corp. v. T & B Structural Sys., Inc., 804 N.E.2d 277, 282 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). Here, the dispute between the parties concerns whether Alan’s actions were a proximate cause of Hel-lums’s injuries.
¶4A negligent act is said to be a proximate cause of an injury “if the injury is a natural and probable consequence, which in the light of the circumstances, should have been foreseen or anticipated.” Paragon Family Restaurant v. Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d 1048, 1054 (Ind.2003). At a minimum, proximate cause requires that the injury would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct. Id.
¶5Here, the evidence, as stated by the majority, reveals that Alan, William Nu-gent, and Ernest Raber were hunting together on the same property that Heliums and his father were using to hunt deer. At some point, Ernest fired multiple shots at a deer but one of his bullets struck Heliums. The evidence further indicates that Alan may have also shot at the deer in question. It is undisputed, however, that the bullet that struck Heliums did not come from Alan’s gun.
¶6Because Alan’s bullet did not strike or otherwise cause injury to Heliums, there is no showing of proximate causation. More specifically, Heliums has failed to demonstrate that his injury would not have occurred but for Alan’s conduct of shooting the gun. In light of this failure to show proximate cause, I do not believe that Hel-iums is entitled to further develop his case factually merely because Alan’s shooting may have encouraged Ernest to shoot. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
¶7For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.