Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 853 P.2d 1149 - People v. Chavez

People v. Chavez’s Empirical Analysis

1993

Citation profile

32
cited by 32 later decisions
1
states following
July 2019
most recently cited

32 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently July 2019 · most notably People v. Blehm (1999), People v. Dunlap (2004)

32 state decisions

220199320002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Boykin v. Alabama · McElroy, Warden v. Holloway · People v. Curtis · People v. Arguello · People v. Chavez

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A trial court exercising appropriate judicial concern for the constitutional right to testify should seek to assure that waiver is voluntary, knowing and intentional by advising the defendant outside the presence of the jury that he has a right to testify, that if he wants to testify then no one can prevent him from doing so, that if he testifies the prosecution will be allowed to cross-examine him, that if he has been convicted of a felony the prosecutor will be entitled to ask him about it and thereby disclose it to the jury, and that if the felony conviction is disclosed to the jury then the jury can be instructed to consider it only as it bears upon his credibility. In connection with the privilege against self-incrimination, the defendant should also be advised that he has a right not to testify and that if he does not testify then the jury can be instructed about that right.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[The defendant] was not informed that, if he testified, his prior felony convictions could be considered only to impeach his credibility. By its silence, the trial court left the impression that the prior convictions could be used as substantive proof for the habitual criminal phase of the trial. Clearly the inference raised by the trial court’s incomplete advisement is wrong. If [the defendant] chose to testify, he would be entitled to an instruction explaining to the jury that evidence of his prior felonies was admitted only for the limited purpose of impeaching his credibility. Further, the prosecution at all times had the burden to prove the defendant’s prior felonies at the habitual criminal phase of the trial. Since the trial court gave the defendant no explanation of these important, but technical, legal concepts, [the defendant] reasonably could have inferred that the prosecution would be relieved of its burden to prove his prior felonies if he testified and were forced to acknowledge his prior felony convictions. The inadequate advisement denied [the defendant] of an opportunity to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to testify.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “litany or formula which must be followed in advising the defendant of his right to testify.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.