854 So. 2d 167 - Pace v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “First and foremost, trial counsel’s investigation into [Pace’s] drug use was reasonable based upon the representations of [Pace] and others. Second, counsel did not withhold any essential information from either expert that was within their possession. Third, neither expert believed at the time of the original evaluation that they had inadequate information to render a diagnosis nor requested additional information from counsel. Fourth, counsel did provide the experts with information that contained insight into [Pace’s] background. The record reveals that counsel provided Szmurlo and Larson with police investigative reports that contained information pertaining to [Pace’s] crack use, hygiene issues, emotional state, and the fact that he stayed in an abandoned house. Counsel also provided Dr. Larson with numerous pretrial statements and depositions. In addition to the background materials, each expert had an opportunity to interview [Pace] and Pace reported heavy crack use to both of them. Despite their knowledge of his crack use and aberrant behavior, both experts failed to develop the presence of organic brain damage or statutory mental mitigation during their initial evaluations. In addition, neither expert recommended that an addictions specialist examine Pace. Moreover, the fact that [Pace] has now secured favorable testimony of mental mitigation and brain damage from Dr. Michael Herkov and Dr. Barry Crown does not render counsel’s investigation into mitigation ineffecti”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Pace v. McNeil

2. “To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ''counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 [, 2064], 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). There is a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Additionally, “there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim ... to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” To prove prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Pace v. McNeil

3. “[W]e do not find that either Hall or the postconviction court relied upon such an assumption. Hall’s testimony was that in his experience, Pace’s cocaine addiction would only be considered “significantly” mitigating if some effect of the addiction could be linked to Pace’s conduct at the time of the offense. Because Pace continued to assert that he was not affected by his crack use at the time of the offense and because Dr. Larson and Dr. Szmurlo, the experts hired by Hall, did not report that Pace’s crack use affected his mental health at the time of the offense, Hall concluded that evidence of Pace’s past crack use would be more prejudicial than beneficial under the circumstances of the defense. Hall concluded that the evidence of crack use would be contrary to his strategic efforts to emphasize with the jury that Pace “had some good qualities and was a human being who should be saved.” Our review of the postconviction order reveals that the court made a factual determination based upon the evidence presented that Hall’s decision was strategic and that the postconviction court applied the correct rule of law.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Pace v. McNeil