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← 855 F.3d 53 - Microsoft Corp. v. United States

Microsoft Corp. v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

855 F.3d 53 · 2017

Citation profile

8
cited by 8 later decisions
August 2018
most recently cited

1 federal appellate ·

Appellate journey

reviewedthe decision below (from New York Southern District Court)

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (§ 201 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (§ 201 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (§ 201 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 28 U.S.C. § 46

Relies on Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco · See v. City of Seattle · Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co. · Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. · Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “functions as a subpoena though the [SCA] calls it a warrant”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “That requirement provides protection for individual privacy interests by requiring the Government to make an adequate showing of probable cause of evidence of a crime or property used to commit a crime to a judge-a well-established standard of Fourth Amendment protection. See id. ; Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c) ; U.S. Const. amend. IV ("[N]o warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."); Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cnty. of S.F. , 387 U.S. 523 , 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (explaining that purpose of Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement "is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials"). .... It makes no difference that Microsoft has chosen to store some electronic communications in other countries. That decision is based on its own business considerations, not privacy concerns for its customers. Microsoft has possession and immediate access to those emails regardless of where it chose to store them. Thus, the second prong of the RJR Nabisco test is satisfied here: the disclosure of the electronic communications occurs in the United States, when Microsoft honors the warrant by disclosing those communications.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “For example, who knew in 1986 that electronic mail-"email"-would become such a primary means of communication that its commercial providers would have millions of servers across the world to store and manage those communications? Or that the recipient of the warrant here-Microsoft-would itself manage over one million server computers, located in over forty countries, used by over one billion customers? Such developments in electronic communications could not have been anticipated at the time of the statute's adoption. Indeed, the task of applying statutes and rules from many years ago to unanticipated advances in technology has been undertaken in other contexts with much difficulty. See, e.g. , United States v. Ganias , 824 F.3d 199 , 219-21 (2d Cir. 2016) ( en banc ).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.