856 So. 2d 187 - State v. Van Dyke’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), the Supreme Court identified four factors which should be used to determine whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his | fright to a speedy trial: the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Length Of The Delay In Barker , the Supreme Court discussed the length of the delay as follows: The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of the delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge. Id. at 530-31 , 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 . In Barker , the Supreme Court found that an over five year delay between the defendant’s arrest and trial was “extraordinary.” Id. at 533 , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 . This court has previously held a three-year delay between arrest and the time of trial is presumptively prejudicial. State v. Ellis, 94-1106 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/1/95), 651 So.2d 949 . [[Image here]] In Barker , the Supreme Court stated t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Boyer

2. “A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown. |snWe have discussed previously the societal disadvantages of lengthy pretrial incarceration, but obviously the dis advantages for the accused who cannot obtain his release are even more serious, The time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on the individual. It often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life; and it enforces idleness. Most jails offer little or no recreational or rehabilitative programs. The time spent in jail is simply dead time. Moreover, if a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense. Imposing those consequences on anyo”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Boyer

3. “On March 27th, defendant filed several motions, discovery motion, a Motion for Production of Exculpatory Evidence, and a Motion and Order for Disclosure of Police Report, the initial report. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides suspension of prescription during the time it takes for the Court to rule on these motions. Under Article 580 suspension of time and time limitations where defendant files a Motion to Quash, or other preliminary plea, to run a period of limitation established by 578 shall be suspended until the ruling of the court thereon; but | inin no case shall the State have less than one year after the ruling to commence the trial. The motions listed above should not be construed as “preliminary pleas” for the purposes of suspension. In addition to the Motion to Quash, Motions for Continuance or for hearings by the defendant are the common examples of defense actions that bring about suspension under that article. Here a judge signed the order the same day the motions were filed, thus suspension did not occur.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Sinclair