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← 858 F.2d 128 - Imperial Casualty and Indemnity Company 88-1075 v. High Concrete Structures Inc & Imperial Casualty and Indemnity Company

Imperial Casualty and Indemnity Company 88-1075 v. High Concrete Structures Inc & Imperial Casualty and Indemnity Company’s Empirical Analysis

858 F.2d 128 · 1988

Citation profile

57
cited by 57 later decisions
7
states following
March 2019
most recently cited

9 federal appellate · 4 district · 9 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 57 later decisions — most recently March 2019 · most notably Lucker Manufacturing Unit of Amclyde Engineered Products Inc v. Home Insurance Company (1994), Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Chester-O'Donley & Associates, Inc. (1998)

9 federal appellate · 4 district · 9 state decisions

2401988199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291

Relies on DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters · Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc. · United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. · Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Linn · Gene & Harvey Builders, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers' Ass'n

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[I]f the language of an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, its ordinary meaning is to be given effect; policy terms should be read to avoid ambiguities; a provision is ambiguous if reasonable persons on considering it in the context of the entire policy could honestly differ as to its meaning; if ambiguities do exist in the wording chosen by the insurance company, they must be resolved in favor of the insured; a court cannot rewrite the terms of a policy or give them a construction in conflict with the accepted and plain meaning of the language of the policy.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “(m) [] loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or destroyed resulting from ... (2) the failure of the named insured’s products ... to meet the level of performance, quality, fitness or durability warranted or represented by the named insured.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “(m) . . . loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or destroyed resulting from (1) a delay in or lack of performance by or on behalf of the named insured of any contract or agreement, or (2) the failure of the named insured's product or work performed by or on behalf of the named insured to meet the level of performance, quality, fitness or durability warranted or represented by the named insured; but this exclusion does not apply to loss of use of other tangible property resulting from the sudden and accidental physical injury to or destruction of the named insured's products or work performed by or on behalf of the named insured after such products or work have been put to use by any person or organization other than an insured; ....”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.