Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department’s Empirical Analysis
858 F.2d 289 · 1988
Citation profile
20 federal appellate · 4 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 59 later decisions — most recently October 2014 · most notably Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital (1992), Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Insurance (1994)
20 federal appellate · 4 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 707 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)
Relies on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green · Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine · Anderson v. City of Bessemer City · United States v. United States Gypsum Co. · International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 59 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Proof of illicit motive is essential, but, especially in cases alleging class-wide discrimination, illicit motive may be inferred from a sufficient showing of disparity between members of the plaintiff class and comparable qualified members of the majority group.” Id. at 295 (quoting Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d at 1265-66 (citation omitted)). The plaintiffs case must, however, eliminate “the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs rejection.” [Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.] Burdine, 450 U.S. [248] at 253—54[ 101 S.Ct. 1089 , 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)]. H* ‡ 'l* The plaintiff who alleges a discriminatory pattern or practice, be it through disciplinary measures or hiring procedures, must ultimately prove “more than a mere occurrence of isolated-or ‘accidental’ or sporadic discriminatory acts. [He must] establish by a preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination was the Company’s standard operating procedure — the regular rather than the unusual practice.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 [ 97 S.Ct. 1843 ]. As Title VII’s legislative history points out: “[A] pattern or practice would be present only where the denial of rights consists of something more than an isolated, sporadic incident, but is repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature.... The point is that single, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by a single business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice .... ” (citations omitted). ****** We find the district court’s find”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[B]ecause it alleged a systemwide pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of Title VII rights, the Government ultimately had to prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or “accidental” or sporadic discriminatory acts. It had to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination was the company’s standard operating procedure — the regular rather than the unusual practice.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“factually unique and qualitatively dissimilar incidents and a corresponding series of appropriately individualized disciplinary actions[.]”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Higgins v. Newhouse
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.