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← 858 F.2d 322 - York v. Tate

York v. Tate’s Empirical Analysis

858 F.2d 322 · 1988

Citation profile

42
cited by 42 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
June 2020
most recently cited

24 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 42 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2020 · most notably State v. Jenks (1991), Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co. (1990)

24 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

18019881990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Evitts v. Lucey · Carafas v. J · Harris v. McRae · National Labor Relations Board v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““In Jackson v. Virginia, the Supreme Court was careful to emphasize that the federal court sitting in habeas should not attempt to substitute its own opinion for that of the jury which convicted the petitioner. ... By applying the [Ohio] rule to test the sufficiency of the evidence in the instant habeas proceeding, the district court exceeded the scope of its proper role by impermissibly dismissing the reasonable conclusions of the jury.... ... By applying the [Ohio] rule, the district court turned the Jackson standard on its head. Rather than asking whether any reasonable juror could have found petitioner guilty, the district court considered whether any reasonable juror could have found the petitioner not guilty.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[T]he mere fact that a judgment previously entered has been reentered or revised in an immaterial way does not toll the time within which review must be sought. Only when the lower court changes matters of substance, or resolves a genuine ambiguity, in a judgment previously rendered should the period within which an appeal must be taken ... begin to run anew. The test is a practical one. The question is whether the lower court, in its second order, has disturbed or revised legal rights and obligations which, by its prior judgment, had been plainly and properly settled with finality.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““the Jackson standard must be applied in conjunction with the Ohio common law rule which provides that where ‘circumstantial evidence alone is relied upon to prove an element essential to a finding of guilt, it must be consistent only with the theory of guilt and irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of innocence.’ ””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.