Common v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis
859 F.2d 467 · 1988
Citation profile
26 federal appellate ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 43 later decisions — most recently November 2011 · most notably Wolf v. City of Fitchburg (1989), Sims v. Mulcahy (1990)
26 federal appellate ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth · United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. · Perry v. Sindermann · Jago v. Van Curen
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Summary judgment is properly entered in favor of a party when the opposing party is unable to make a showing sufficient to prove an essential element of a case on which the opposing party bears the burden of proof.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““the Supreme Court has pointed to the analogous doctrines of ‘implied contracts’ arising from parties’ mutual understandings and of the ‘common law of a particular plant that may supplement a collective-bargaining agreement.’ A party utilizing ... evidence of custom or policy to establish a mutually explicit understanding capable of giving rise to a legitimate claim of entitlement in continued employment, must demonstrate ‘ “an expectation ... that was legally enforceable”, a mutually binding obligation.’ Upadhya v. Langenberg, 834 F.2d 661 , 665 (7th Cir.1987) (citations omitted). This expectation must be something which ‘ “is securely and durably yours under state (or ... federal) law, as distinct from what you hold subject to so many conditions as to make your interest meager, transitory, or uncertain. ’ ’ Yatvin [v. Madison Metropolitan School District, 840 F.2d 412 , 417 (7th Cir.1988) ] (quoting Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943 , 948 (7th Cir.1983)). It is clear that ‘a mutually subjective and unilateral expectancy is not protected by due process.’ Davis [v. City of Chicago, 841 F.2d 186 , 188 (7th Cir.1988) ] (citation omitted).””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which the party will bear the burden the proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be 'no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is 'entitled to judgment as a matter of law' because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.