State v. Beavers’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he rationale for permitting war-rantless entries into private residences is totally inapplicable in the Terry context. Warrantless entries are justified with probable cause and exigent circumstances because in such circumstances, the delay to obtain a search warrant would risk “physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, [or] the escape of the suspect.” United States v. Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.1984)). In -contrast, a Terry stop is justified on the basis that police should be able to briefly stop citizens to investigate circumstances which lead an officer “reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-23, 30 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-81, 1884 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (emphasis added). Thus, the only risk that exists if an investigatory stop is not effected is the risk that investigation of potential criminal activity might be delayed or, at worst, thwarted altogether. That risk is diminished in the residential setting because the person police wish to question is located in a dwelling that can generally be staked out until the person emerges, if a polite knock at the door fails to produce a suspect willing to voluntarily answer police inquiries.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Lala · 2009 UT App 390 - State v. Perkins

2. “[Plolice cannot create the exigency in order to justify a warrantless entry.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Kelly · State v. Tripp

3. “More importantly, we believe the Edwards I panel misinterpreted the Santana decision. We view the Santana Court’s articulation of the hot pursuit doctrine as |12nothing more than a specific application of the general rule that a warrantless entry of a private residence must be justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances. Nowhere in Santana did the Court hint it was expanding the application of this rule to circumstances amounting to less than probable cause. In fact, as noted above, the Santana Court, by its own language, based its decision on the facts that the police possessed probable cause to arrest defendant and defendant’s action created an exigency whereby evidence of a serious crime would have been destroyed had police delayed their pursuit. Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43 , 96 S.Ct. at 2409-10 . By expanding the Santana exception to Terry stops, the Edwards I panel disregarded the Supreme Court’s directive that exceptions to the warrant requirement should be few in number, carefully delineated, and jealously drawn. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 , 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097 , 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). Moreover, in Welsh the Supreme Court narrowed rather than expanded Santana’s carefully delineated exception to the warrant requirement by holding that, despite the State’s claim that potential loss of evidence constituted exi”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Lala