State v. Mallan’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[W]here an individual’s conduct, or a class of individuals’ conduct, does not directly harm others the public interest is not affected and [such conduct] is not properly the subject of the police power of the' legislature. However, where the legislature has determined that the conduct of a particular’ class of people recklessly affects them physical well-being and that the consequent physical injury and death is so widespread as to be of grave concern to the public and where the incidence and severity of the physical harm has been statistically demonstrated to the satisfaction of th[is c]ourt, then the conduct of that class of people affects the public interest and is properly within the scope of the police power. Of course, where the conduct sought to be regulated is in furtherance of a specific constitutional right, a different situation arises.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Romano · State v. Kimmel

2. “the purported right to possess and use marijuana is not a fundamental right and a compelling state interest is not required.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. State v. Sunderland · State v. Kimmel

3. “The first approach was applied by this court in State v. Mueller, 66 Haw. 616 , 671 P.2d 1351 (1983), and later by the plurality in Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530 , 852 P.2d 44 , reconsideration granted in part, 74 Haw. 650 , 875 P.2d 225 (1993). Under this approach, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.” Mueller, 66 Haw. at 628 , 671 P.2d at 1355 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 [, 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 ] ... (1973)) (citations omitted). In determining which rights are fundamental, we must look to the “traditions and [collective] conscience of our people” to determine whether a principle is “so rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental.” ... The inquiry is whether a right involved “is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions’.... ” Baehr, 74 Haw. at 556 , 852 P.2d at 57 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 [, 85 S.Ct. 1678 , 14 L.Ed.2d 510 ] ... (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (alterations in original)). If a right is determined to be fundamental, it is subject to interference only when a compelling state interest is demonstrated. In the absence of a fundamental right, however, a statute need only satisfy the minimum rationality requirements of due process, i.e., it must have a rationa”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Sunderland