86 Ill. 2d 274 - Phillips v. Graham’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 68 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 97 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““There is no such delegation of a recognized legislative power here. The right to exclude patrons from a private enterprise, here a racetrack, has long been recognized at common law. (See, e.g., Marrone v. Washington Jockey Club (1913), 227 U.S. 633 , 57 L. Ed. 679 , 33 S. Ct. 401 ; Flores v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc. (1961), 55 Cal.2d 736 , 361 P.2d 921 , 13 Cal. Rptr. 201 ; Tamelleo v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc. (1960), 102 N.H. 547 , 163 A.2d 10 ; Annot., 90 A.L.R.3d 1361 (1979).) Though it cannot be said that section 9(e), which goes further and permits the exclusion of occupation licensees, is a precise codification of the common law right, it is clear that the authority to exclude here is not derived from some recognized legislative power, unique to the legislature, that has been delegated to organization licensees. It is simply, as the State argues, a grant of authority by the legislature.” 86 Ill. 2d at 288-89 , 427 N.E.2d at 556 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Eric Brooks, Jeffrey Yass and Kenneth Brodie v. Chicago Downs Association, Inc., D/B/A Sportsman's Park · 295 Ill. App. 3d 499 - Pernalski v. Illinois Racing Board

2. ““Wagering or gambling is an activity which is ‘subject to regulation or to complete prohibition’ (Finish Line Express, Inc. v. City of Chicago (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 131, 138 ) and one in which the State’s interest in protecting the public from dishonest practices and in preserving the integrity of horse racing is clear. It is a truism to say that the horse-racing industry depends upon public confidence in the sport and upon integrity and professional efficiency in its operation. A review of the Horse Racing Act and its comprehensive and detailed list of statutory requirements discloses the legislature’s interest in imposing strict controls on an industry which on occasion has been vulnerable to dishonest men and practices.” Phillips v. Graham (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 274, 286 , 427 N.E.2d 550 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 179 Ill. App. 3d 353 - Hansen v. Illinois Racing Board · 127 Ill. App. 3d 702 - Kline v. Illinois Racing Board

3. ““The Board, and any person or persons to whom it delegates this power, may eject or exclude from any race meeting or organization grounds or any part thereof, any occupation licensee or any other individual whose conduct or reputation is such that his presence on organization grounds may, in the opinion of the Board, call into question the honesty and integrity of horse racing or interfere with the orderly conduct of horse racing; provided, however, that no person shall be excluded or ejected from organization grounds solely on the grounds of race, color, creed, national origin, ancestry, or sex. The power to eject or exclude occupation licensees may be exercised for just cause by the organization licensee or the Board, subject to subsequent hearing by the Board as to the propriety of said exclusion.” (Emphasis added.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 295 Ill. App. 3d 499 - Pernalski v. Illinois Racing Board